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ABSTRACT
COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE INFORMATION AGE: A CASE STUDY OF A
REPRESENTATIVE AIR POWER COMMAND AND CONTROL NODE
Marvin L. Simpson, Jr.
Old Dominion University, 2015 
Director: Dr. Charles B. Keating
As operations command structures change, it is important to be able to explore 
and understand their fundamental nature; researchers should unearth the gestalt nature of 
the operational node. The organizational structure and the infrastructure can significantly 
affect overall command and control (C2) performance. Thus, it is necessary to develop 
understanding of effectiveness of the technical network and the people using the system 
as a whole.
The purpose of this research is to conduct an analysis of a representative Air 
Power Operational C2 node, create and use a repeatable method, and present the results 
as a case study to elicit fundamental understanding. I posit that there is a recognizable 
(and discoverable) relationship between the social (human) network and technical 
supporting network. Examining the system under change can result in an understanding 
of this relationship. In this work, I enhanced an existing simulation tool to investigate the 
effects of organizational structure on task effectiveness. The primary research question 
examined is how a representative AOC system changes varying noise and system 
fragmentation when operating in two different organizational constructs.
Network-Enabled Capability (as the term is used in NATO), Network Centric 
Operations, or Edge Organizations, is a core C2 transformation predicated upon a set of
network-centric tenets. These tenets form the intellectual foundation for ongoing 
transformations. The secondary research question is to determine if these tenets are 
unbound, and what elucidation results if they are not.
This research produces four significant contributions to Operational Command 
and Control and Engineering Management disciplines. First, I combined social 
networking theory and information theory into a single lens for evaluation. By using this 
new concept, I will be able to accomplish a quantitative evaluation by something other 
than mission treads, field exercise, historical evaluation, or actual combat. Second, I used 
both information theory and social networking concepts in a non-traditional setting. 
Third, I hope this research will start the process required to gain the knowledge to 
achieve some sort of future C2 structure. Fourth, this research suggests directions for 
future research to enhance understanding o f core Operational Command and Control 
concepts.
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION
A precise answer to the wrong question can be more harmful than an eclectic 
answer to the right question. The wrong question to ask about the Command and Control 
(C2) domain is how to best line up all the computer systems and applications to achieve 
the reality promised in the marketing phrase, ‘the right information, at the time, and at the 
right location in the right format.’ This phrase is misleading on three counts: the sales 
pitch defines a priori information as equivalent to a posteriori information; this carnival 
worker’s call implies global data coupling in which all information has the same pedigree 
(level of validity, level o f security, level of availability, level reciprocity, etc.); and that 
data will be shared ubiquitously. Information age warfare will be different from industrial 
age warfare:
The war, as any other human activity, is a product of its age, its weapons and 
strategies permanently evolved in the same time with the technology 
development. The future war in the “information age” embeds the unique 
characteristics of this period, thus being different than the other types o f war 
previously conducted and affecting the operation capabilities and the nature o f the 
conflict environment. (OPERAN, 2012)
The difference may be as great or greater than the difference between agrarian age 
warfare and industrial age warfare. Air power and ground power have combined to 
achieve the operational objectives in the last five US wars. Command and Control is the 
glue that holds it all together. The better research question is: how should C2 be studied 
for fundamental understanding?
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An actual air power C2 system exists only when engaging an adversary. The 
actual system is a combination of the people and infrastructure in place accomplishing an 
actual military mission. An Air Operations Center (AOC) is a Knowledge Management 
C2 entity in which humans either analyze or synthesize inflowing data. Data flows into 
the organizations, which are an abstraction o f the actual world, and requires processing in 
such a manner that output influences the actual world. I posit there is a recognizable (and 
discoverable) relationship between the social network and technical network operating in 
an AOC. By examining the system under change, that relationship can become 
understandable. Changes in the technical network will result in changes in the social 
network, and changes in the social network will result in a measurable difference in 
utilization of the technical network,
I propose that, in the AOC, two separate networks exist with limited touch points. 
One set of connections is a technical network that conveys data, and the other is a human 
command network that manipulates data, transforms it into information, and produces 
decisions that result in output. To achieve an epistemic understanding o f the totality of 
the node, both networks require harmonization of understanding by determining how an 
action in one network affects the other network. If the AOC node is understandable, then 
there is a high probability that the knowledge can extend to other organizations. A classic 
scientific research approach implies qualitative research as the prerequisite needed to 
accomplish quantitative evaluation; I am pursuing initial qualitative research. Exploratory 
case study research such as this study is not a random sampling o f a given system. That is 
an assertion of major researchers in case studies to include Yin (2003) and Stake (1995). 
This case is designed to maximize knowledge acquisition during the time period, and
3
within the given resource constraints. Exploratory case studies have been used by others, 
such as the 1997 RAND Weapons Mixed and Exploratory Analysis by Arthur Brookes, 
Steve Bankes, and Bart Bennett. In the RAND introduction, they define an exploratory 
analysis as a method to help comprehend complex systems such as combat models, which 
may have imperfectly known parameters, decisions, and measures o f effectiveness.
An important determination is to define the unique contributions “C2 in the 
Information Age” brings to the plethora of C2 thought. To start that determination, I 
segregate seminal authors in both IT and Social Networking into two schools of thought. 
The IT school of thought deals more with machine themes and consists o f authors such 
as: Shannon (1949), Ashby (1948), Beer (1985), Conant (1976), Sommerhoff (1950), 
Brillouin (1962), Norretranders (1991), and Waelchli (1989). Some o f the authors lean 
deeper towards machined themes than others, but as a group, they all lean away from 
human/organizational themes. The other school of contemplative activity consists of 
authors that are concerned with human/organizational themes, such as Mathieu (2000), 
Carley (1997); Klimoski and Mohammed (1994), Sonnenwald and Pierce (1998), Kaplan 
(1980), Graham (2004), Barnes (1954), Hanneman (2005), Granovetter (1973); Milgram 
(1967). Between these giant schools of thought there is a much smaller, often more 
disjointed dojo of authors that write about themes that bind both mechanical and human 
themes under a widely chassed net of differing perspectives. These are authors like 
Bharadwaj andKonsynski (1999) Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000); Aral and Weill (2007), 
Hinds and Kiesler (2002), Cyert and March (1963), Arrow (1962), Stiglitz (2000). and 
Joslyn and Rocha (2000). I have to cast my lot with this third group of ronin.
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Defining into which daimyo of thought I should bin this dissertation does not 
define the unique contribution of this work. As Sutton (1986) points out, a common 
definition of C2 will most likely never congeal. Just because something does not carry a 
universally recognized moniker does not mean it cannot be thought about or measured, or 
made better. Between C2 theory and C2 operations stands C2 Systems. According to 
Maykish (2014), "C2 history shows that C2 theorists navigated megatrend-type changes 
while gaining insight into C2 fundamentals at the same time.” His supposition results in 
the following chart:
5
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Figure 1. Modification of Maykish (2014)
The unique contribution of this paper is to begin to sort through the “Uncertain” that 
currently defines Maykish's Stage 6 by pushing against the walls o f darkness in which 
humanity eternally struggles.
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1.1 A BRIEF HISTORY
Operational air power is executing targeting, from the air, over a broad time and 
space. The implementation of an Air Tasking Order (ATO) will most likely accomplish 
Air Power either in an industrial age model or in an information age model. The purpose 
of the ATO and Air Control Order (ACO), as defined Joint Publication 1-02 (2010), is:
‘A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and 
command and control agencies projected sorties, capabilities and/or forces to 
targets and specific missions, (p. 11)’ while and ACO is ‘An order implementing 
the airspace control plan that provides the details of the approved requests for 
airspace coordinating measures, (p. 9)
To understand how the technical network and human network overlap in the 
execution of operational Air Power Command and Control, we should understand the 
history of the USMTF ATO production tool. The ATO message has two sub-sets: Mission 
Data Lines (MSNDAT) and Special Operation Instructions (SPINS). Traditionally, the 
AOC staff creates MSNDAT, and mostly Air Force Forces (AFFOR) staff correlates much 
of the information required for SPINS. Both sets o f information and the information in the 
ACO message are required to execute combat air power.
Automated building of the ATO message started with a Disk Operating System 
program, Frag Works, which ran on a 286 PC in the early 1980s. The program allowed one 
person (generally a clerk-typist) to fill blank fields in the USMTF message (today, we 
would call this message a text or flat file). A group of experts performed all planning 
(including sortie deconfliction and tanker scheduling) by hand calculation or using other 
stand-alone computer systems.
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Today (the year 2014), a Theater Air Planner (TAP) produces the ATO message, 
but the expert creators of the ATO no longer use the TAP applications as their primary 
input tool; they use Master Air Attack Planning Tool Kit (MAAPTK). MAAPTK was 
developed as a better graphical interface to build missions for inclusion into the ATO. 
MAAPTK enables planners to visualize and generate missions quickly and accurately. 
Expert planners see information on tables with timelines, maps, and graphs so that they can 
quickly understand the essential parts of the planning problem. Additionally, they can 
create their missions and packages using a simple drag-and-drop action. MAAPTK 
significantly streamlines the total MAAP/ATO production process and reduces some 




Figure 2. Example Derived from MAAPTK User Manual
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In light o f this history, it is clear that an effective Operational Airpower node like 
the AOC must look well beyond the simple design philosophy that resulted in the creation 
of the current USMTF message. To continue to achieve leadership goals, we need to 
understand and discover core C2 concepts.
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
As previously stated, in any Command and Control (C2) node including an Air 
Operations Center (AOC), there are two separate networks that have limited touch points. 
Nevertheless, in an information age, these networks must work together to be efficient.
In most cases, people dealing with events occurring closer to “now” will 
synthesize more and analyze less. In effect, the internal human system and the external 
system become one homogeneous mass. One of the difficulties swiftly encountered in 
researching C2 is high variability in the quality o f literature about the subject, as the 
writings express the authors’ cogitative concepts about a wide range of subjects. Many 
writings are articulated with thoughts that are an ‘inch deep and a mile wide’ in 
quantitative or qualitative facts, leading to the near impossibility of repeatability as 
validation. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to conduct a comparison analysis of 
a representative Air Power Operational C2 node using a case study design to elicit 
fundamental understanding. The goal of the research is to face the future and compare a 
representative C2 node to a differently constructed C2 node, and not to compare the 
results to an actual C2 node using historical evidence.
1.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Current AOC organizational realities have: (1) a high degree o f technological 
complexity required to manage massive amounts of data; (2) non-linear knowledge
9
intensive work; (3) changing battle space influencing work system effectiveness; and (4) 
turbulent—uncertain and rapidly changing—mission requirements.
Any electronically stored, transmitted, or recorded data is neither information nor 
knowledge. Humans must give these mathematically defined and physically manipulated 
voltages context. At the same time, the language o f data, information, and knowledge 
can convey an appropriate extraction o f reality. By using language to transform data into 
an understanding of reality any military corps or above organization, such as an AOC, is 
in reality a knowledge management entity. The AOC is not the only command node in 
the human control that relies on an artificial representation of reality to make decisions 
and provide life changing outputs. The operations center of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) 
has similarities with the Combat Operation divisions of an AOC. Information theory 
work has been accomplished in conjunction with NPPs using Conant’s Model as a tool 
for describing human information processing (Kim, Soong, & Poong, 2003). Using a 
cross discipline tool like information flow theory to evaluate the AOC can provide a 
proven quantitative measure. Replicating an actual theater technical milieu, if 
theoretically possible, would be cost prohibitive (and most likely the adversary would not 
volunteer to participate). Incorporating a measure (Conanf s Model) for information 
processes may achieve the goal of repeatability. More importantly, a quantitative 
measure of information processing provides a hope of minimizing the human variable by 
putting the human in the background.
Social networking theory (SNT) is one of the few theories that can apply to both 
small groups and planet-sized groups. Any network describes some type o f relationship. 
The simplest of networks has two nodes tied by a link. The node is the end point, and the
10
link is what ties them together. [Social] Network analysis has grown from the esoteric 
interest of a few mathematically inclined sociologists to a legitimate mainstream 
perspective. Harrison White and Affiliates, who also developed a formal apparatus for 
thinking about and analyzing social structure as networks (Nohria, 1998), spearheaded 
social networking development in the 1970s. Social network analysis (SNA) is an 
appropriate tool to evaluate the human networking side of C2. Social network theory 
looks at relationships in terms of links and nodes. Nodes are the individuals, and links are 
a relationship between the individuals. There are many different ways people can be 
linked (face-to-face, e-mail, text chat, phone, meetings, etc.), and each interaction has an 
effect on the whole. Those interactions will be instantaneous (shared) or asymmetric 
(posted/pulled). Social networking proposes individuals are less important than their 
relationships. Those relationships define a structure that can be studied (Barnes, 1954; 
Granovetter, 1973; Milgram, 1967).
The origins o f information theory (IT) begin with C.E. Shannon and his article,
“A Mathematical Theory o f Communication,” published in 1948. Shannon proposed 
entropy as a measure o f information, choice, and uncertainty. Entropy was a measure in 
such diverse communities such as biology, decision theory, and thermodynamics. 
Information relates to uncertainty, which can be given as a function. The amount of 
information and bits, is equal to the base 2 logarithm of the inverse of the probability:
H i-L o g  2 1/Pi ( 1 )
Hi is the amount of information and Pi is the probability of occurrence o f /. Using a formal 
mathematical construct for information, I can remove the human subject constraint 
concerning any “value” o f one generic informational blob as compared to another.
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Working within the brackets of SNT and IT, the first research question is: Can a 
framework be constructed using Social Networking Theory and Information Theory to 
evaluate a representative Air Power C2 node?
The year 2009 was pivotal in Air Force history. It was the first year the Service 
bought more Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and trained more pilots to fly them than 
traditional aircraft. If warfighters flying combat vehicles are not required to move into a 
forward Area o f Responsibility (AoR), why should it be necessary to send a large AOC 
forward to provide the C2? By viewing a single representative C2 node stereoscopically 
using a formal case study method, this single emulation could be a step toward an 
epistemic understanding of a distributed/federated C2 structure.
The nature of war historically adapts to the technology available. Metaphorically, 
ancient military operations were more like solid mechanics, whereas fluid mechanics 
could well represent industrial age combat. The term that best applies to knowledge age 
combat is ‘Cloud’ centric, in which a small world of knowledge drives the understanding 
of truth. Therefore, the last research question is to determine if the current tents of 
network-centric warfare are unbound. A diagram of the relationship between the purpose 














Figure 3. Relationship between Purpose and Question
1.4 NATURE OF THE STUDY
This case study is to see how the AOC C2 system changes varying noise and 
system fragmentation using a representative C2 model. The goal is to extract fundamental 
understanding o f Air Power C2 operating in an information age environment establishing 
a baseline and using a repeatable method. If the approach is successful, it may offer new 
insights into the detection and analysis required for the understanding many o f complex 
C2 systems.
The AOC is not the only command node under human control that relies on an 
artificial representation of reality to make decisions and provide life-changing outputs. 
Using Conant’s Model as a tool for describing human information processing has 
accomplished IT work in conjunction with NPPs (Kim, Soong, & Poong 2003). The 











































Using cross-disciplinary tools of social networking and information flow to 
evaluate the AOC provides a proven repeatable quantitative measure.
Air Power Command and Control (C2) have unique characteristics. Air Power 
actions execute extremely quickly, and any coordination required to meet a new need 
(change in an ATO) has to happen well before the planned event occurs. Subsequently, 
the larger the change implemented, in turn, requires more coordination. There are 
general rules for the time required for planning an event, but they are coarse grain at best. 
There has been very little research using a repeatable method design specifically to 
understand core operational Air Power C2 issues. Successful heuristics exist in the 
crucible of combat, but it is best not to rely solely only on this method as the risk to 
mission accomplishment or loss o f life can be extreme. Therefore, a human validated C2 
model will function as the research milieu.
1.5 ASSUMPTIONS
Researching whether a model should be created, or if an appropriate C2 model 
was available, took several months. The Experimental Laboratory for Investigation 
Collaboration, Information-sharing and Trust (ELICIT) is a tool for modeling the 
behaviors of individuals in various organizational networks. Sponsored by a project 
within the Office o f the Assistant Secretary o f Defense (OASD) Networks and 
Information Integration (Nil), ELICIT has an online multi-user software platform for 
conducting experiments and demonstrations in information-sharing and trust. Developers 
have reworked and refined ELICIT over a period o f eight years. Direct development 
investment by the Command and Control Research Project (CCRP) has been greater than
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$2 million. Researchers have provided significant additional resources (including human 
participants) directly. An international group o f researchers has vetted and refined 
ELICIT. The software agents were developed and tuned based on data and experience 
with live participants. It is rare to have a research platform that supports both human and 
agent participants. The ELICIT software platform allows researchers and instructors to 
precisely model specific Command and Control (C2) processes, as well as edge 
organization processes and to fully instrument all interactions. The original project 
objective was to enable a series o f online experiments to compare the relative efficiency 
and effectiveness of various organization types, traditional C2 vs. self-organizing, peer- 
based edge (E) organizational forms, in performing tasks that require decision-making 
and collaboration. ELICIT supports configurable task scenarios. The original baseline 
experiment task is to identify the ‘who, what, where, and when’ o f an adversary attack 
based on information factoids that become known to individuals in a team or group of 
teams. The independent variable for the baseline experiment is whether a team is 
organized using traditional C2 vs. Edge organization principles. The software agent- 
based version of ELICIT (abELICIT) uses software agents whose behavior is defined by 
over 50 variables, which can be configured to model various social and cognitive 
behaviors, and operations and performance delays.
To date, both military and civilian institutions have run ELICIT with both human 
and software agent participants internationally. The agent behavior was modeled upon 
and validated against the actual behavior o f human participants in ELICIT exercises. For 
this work, developers enhanced the existing tool to meet an emerging need. The original 
ELICIT tasks are intelligence scenarios. The ELICIT model was extended to handle a
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more complex operational scenario. ELICIT is modified to model the operational task of 
an Air Operations Center (AOC) issuing an Air Tasking Order (ATO) Change Order.
The assumption is that the modified agent-based tool maintained its validation as 
compared to a human-based tool. Additional research could validate this assumption.
1.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Limitations o f a study are the factors the researcher cannot control. Three factors 
limit this case study: (1) the core design of ELICIT; (2) the associated data collection 
tool; and (3) the data analysis tools. The baseline ELICIT task (Ruddy, 2007) is an 
intelligence task. Periodically during an experiment, ELICIT distributes factoids (i.e., 
information elements that are pieces of the scenario) to the participants. Participants can 
choose to disseminate or not disseminate factoids to others by ‘sharing’ (symmetric data 
movement) information directly with a particular participant or by ‘posting’ (asymmetric 
data movement) a factoid to a particular information system. However, only by 
communicating information can participants achieve sufficient levels of awareness to 
complete the task.
The four original baseline factoid sets each contain 68 factoids (four for each of 
the 17 participants). These factoids contain only true information. There is no incorrect 
or conflicting information.
Each baseline factoid set consists of 17 Key or Expertise, 17 Supportive, and 34 
Noise factoids. Thus, the ratio of relevant information to noise is 50%. In the baseline 
factoid set, ELICIT distributes the factoids in three waves. Thus it is not until after that 
third wave that all the information is available to the participant group to fully identify 
the ‘who, what, where and when’ of the adversary attack. The factoids are evenly
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distributed so that by the end of the third distribution, each participant has received one 
Key or Expertise factoid, one supportive factoid, and two noise factoids. For purposes of 
the original experiment design, I took care to treat each participant equally. The factoid 
scenarios are anonymized to reduce distractions based on previous experiences.
I mapped the access matrix of each group to each information system website and 
instantiated them in an ELICIT organization configuration file (See Appendix C). Since 
some o f the systems are ‘read-only' with respect to some of the groups, I worked to 
enhanced the ELICIT organization file structure to support read-only access. I also 
configured this organization file to reflect whether point-to-point sharing was possible 
between the groups. I created variations on this structure to determine the efficiency and 
effectiveness of various intergroup process flows and procedures.
In addition to creating a new organization file, I also worked with ELICIT to 
create a new task scenario. I created a total o f 51 Key and Expertise factoids, and mapped 
their order o f precedence into seven sequential waves of information flow. In addition, I 
also created and mapped supportive and noise factoids. The operations factoid set is 
listed in Appendix C.
The ‘what' data made available to the researcher are predetermined by ELICIT.
As with any modeling and simulation base research, it is assumed the model is correctly 
coded and output data are what the researcher desires. ELICIT has developed an analysis 
tool to help the researcher sort through all resulting data. Both available analysis tools 
lack complete documentation, and it assumes all columns, rows, buttons, pull-downs and 
other functions listed correspond to a common/obvious definition of term supplied by 
creator o f the applications.
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1.7 DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Delimitations are factors of a study the researcher can control. The nature o f this 
air power model based C2 case study may limit its generalizability. The following four 
delimitations bind this study:
1) This study will consist o f only one model, the number of agents will be static, 
their interactions will be scripted, and the outcome decision is known as it is 
provided. Information derived from the study may not be capable o f direct 
extrapolation to an actual AOC.
2) The rational human actor does not exist in the real world, and how actual combat 
decisions are made is well beyond the scope of this dissertation. Therefore, I 
made a limiting assumption to assume shared understanding (a measurable 
quantity) was equivalent to a decision.
3) The fundamental approach I took in this C2 effort is to map organizations 
interacting with the AOC to ELICIT participants and to model the key 
information flows between these groups as text base word strings. Required 
changes are categorized into configuration changes and coding changes. Only 28 
groups are identified as related to the AOC Air Tasking Order change operation. 
In addition, I identified owners of only ten shared information points (webpages) 
(asymmetric data holding sites).
Next, I configured 28 ELICIT software agents to represent each o f the 28 
groups’ collective behaviors with respect to information flows with the other 
groups. For example, when a decision is made that a target should not be hit, the 
target is added to the no hit target list system. As is typically done with ELICIT
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agents, their actions were configured with a series of task process delays so that 
the time the agent takes to perform a task is mapped to human time rather than 
computer time. In configuring the agents, I found a few areas where 
modifications needed to be made to support posting of information to website 
names that were other than the traditional who, what, where and when names.
4) I derived relationships and organization structures from the best available 
information, so all limitations resulting from execration errors are solely the 
responsibility of the author.
1.8 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS
The AOC weapon system (WS) is the operational level warfighting command 
center for air, space, and cyberspace forces. Like any military command node, the AOC 
can be represented as a task model because positional functions are well understood. This 
organization allows creation of operation sequence diagrams for deeper analysis. The 
(AN/USQ-163) Falconer AOC is the senior element of the Theater Air Control System 
(TACS) and provides centralized command, planning, direction, control, and 
coordination o f air, space and cyberspace operations. The five divisions o f the AOC are 
made up of numerous smaller teams: plan, control, assess air, space, and cyberspace 
operations. If other services or nations provide air, space, or cyber forces to a joint or 
coalition operation or campaign, the overall commander will normally designate a 
Combined/Joint Force Air Component Commander (C/JFACC) to control such forces. 
The fundamental tenet of this system is centralized planning and control through the 










Figure 5. Notional JFACC Organization JAOC
The primary function of the divisions of the AOC is to produce and execute an 
Air Tasking Order (ATO) and associated documents like the Airspace Control Order 
(ACO). The Air Force has fielded five permanent Falconers worldwide to meet 
continuing air power challenges. In any operation involving air power, a single 
commander is designated the responsible member for all air power forces assigned and 
attached. In a theater-size military campaign, as many as 2,500 people inside the 
Combined/Joint AOC (C/JAOC) move massive amounts o f information across multiple 
communication networks at various security levels. The CAOC provides the Commander 
the capability to direct the activities of assigned, supporting, or attached forces and 
monitor the actions o f both enemy and friendly forces; the core processes remain the 
same. Figure 3 depicts a typical AOC, presented for reference only.
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Figure 6. Generic AOC Organization
This dissertation evaluates only the Combat Operations Division (COD). The 
COD, Figure 9, executes the current ATO (e.g., the 24 hours encompassing the effective 
period). It is divided into four teams: Offensive Operations, Defensive Operations, 
Interface Control, and Senior Intelligence Duty Officer (SIDO). Time Sensitive Targeting 
(TST) and Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) are two key processes that require 
immediate attention on the COD floor. Various specialty/support personnel are also 
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Figure 7. Notional COD
1.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY
When discussions associated with C2 became cantankerous and non-productive, 
one of my past supervisors would always ask, ‘What is a pound of C2 worth?’ 
Contingency theory states that there is no best way to organize; not all ways to organize 
are equally effective. The theory states qualitative rules observed through research on
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how companies organize in specific contexts, and how organizations with different 
structures perform in those contexts. For example, empirical research found companies 
engaged in routine predictable work perform better if they are more centralized and 
tightly controlled, whereas companies whose tasks have a higher level of uncertainty 
need to be decentralized and loosely controlled. In 1973, Jay Galbraith introduced an 
information processing view o f organizations. The model abstracts work as simply as the 
quantity o f information to be processed, and argues that the greater the uncertainty o f the 
task, the greater the amount of information must be processed to complete it. Galbraith 
defines uncertainty as “the difference between the amount of information required to 
perform the task and the amount of information already possessed by the organization” 
(1973).
Researching C2 must be more about seeking a holistic synthesis o f contemplation 
rather than a comprehensive analysis of mankind’s follies and triumphs. By seeking to 
understand the potential benefit of cross correlating two major themes o f thought (Social 
Networking and Information Theory), one may place a framework on a single command 
node within a single physical domain. The resulting investigating has allowed an 
extraction of truths. Only through deep inquiry can one strip away mythology and 
superstition in hope of establishing truths that withstand the test o f time. One goal of this 
dissertation is to create a repeatable solution that extends the field o f knowledge of 
Operational Air Power and C2.
Figure 8, below, summarizes the framework guiding this study:
Purpose 
1 --------
The purpose of this research is to conduct an analysis o f a representative Air 
Power Operational node using a case study design to elicit fundamental
understanding.
Primary Research Question
How does a representative AOC C2 system changes, varying noise 







( Are the tenets of NCW are unbound? What are elucidation results if  the tenets are not unbound?
Figure 8. Guiding Framework
For readability a consolidate table view  o f this research exploration is proved and expounded  
upon in Table 8.
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Table 1. The overarching goal is to link questions to research objectives
Research Question
How does a representative AOC C2 
system changes, varying noise and system 
fragmentation, when in a Nominal or 
Edge organizational constructs?
Are the tenets o f NCW are unbound?
What elucidation results if the tenets are 
not unbound?
Linked Research Objective
Determine whether Critical Systems 
Thinking can be applied to military 
Command and Control
Recognize factors in NCW that are 
particularly influential
Identify and implement combinations of 
systems approaches that help Command 
and Control practitioners
In Chapter 2 ,1 will create a new lens to look at Operational Command and Control. 
Chapter 2 will appraise the literature. Chapter 3 will describe the methods and 
procedures applied for assembling and analyzing the data for this study.
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CHAPTER TWO - THEMATIC REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE
The study of Command and Control is such a broad subject that one could wander 
around it for years and never come out of the forest. When I started this journey, I had a 
basic understanding of my purpose and research questions. I knew I could work through 
creating a conceptual model and hoped I could generate output from a physical model. I 
did not know if I was going to find a physical model to use or if  I would need to incur the 
cost both monetarily and of time required to build a model. Given my starting criteria, I 
searched for a process that would facilitate the journey. The process had to allow depth 
of inquiry, but more importantly, it had to allow a wide breadth of inquiry because I did 
not know what 1 would find in the literature or where it would lead me. According to 
Karl-Heinz Simon (2009) a critical systems endeavor has three intentions:
1. Complementarism: to reveal and critique the theoretical (ontological and 
epistemological) and methodological bases of systems approaches, and to reflect 
upon the problem situations in which approaches can properly be employed and to 
critique their actual use.
2. Emancipation: to develop systems thinking and practice beyond its present 
conservative limitations and, in particular, to formulate new methodologies to 
tackle problem situations where the operation of power prevents the proper use of 
the newer soft systems approaches.
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3. Critical reflection: to reflect upon the relationships between different 
organizational and societal interests and the dominance of different systems 
theories and methodologies.
These three criteria aligned well with my purpose and research questions. I used CST as 
a bounding method to use my available time effectively. The following sections break 
down by Critical Awareness, Emancipation (human improvement), and Pluralism, and 
represent my voyage down a path less taken.
2.1 CRITICAL AWARENESS
Critical awareness is learning and thinking critically and deeply on both 
theoretical and practical matters on a subject. Command and Control (C2) has been 
around at least as long as militaries have been engaged in conflict; therefore reviewing 
the entire field of C2 would be a daunting task. Thusly, I will use Critical System 
Thinking (CST), as an enquiring process. Using CST allows one to consider a plethora of 
systems approaches when observing problems in order to improve the responses to 
situations that are dynamic and moving toward chaotic (Jackson, 2003). The purpose of 
this review is to achieve a readiness o f action by defining slices o f current literature in 
multiple fields. CST allows some articulation of the relevant myths and meanings o f what 
is studied as well as defining the logic for achieving purposes, which can be expressed in 
the comparisons o f what is teased out, challenged, and tested. The three theoretical 
commitments in CST are (1) critical awareness, (2) emancipation or improvement, and 
(3) pluralism (Jackson, 2000). CST is an appropriate research technique to understand 
fundamental C2 issues. A formal literature review would provide a valid and simplified 
method to start to accomplish that goal. In addition, C2 is quite a diverse term because it
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is broad enough to encompass many meanings and applies to many situations where 
other, more specific terms, e.g., communications, would convey a more accurate 
meaning. As Sutton (1986) points out, “Most o f the articles are well worth reading, but 
one is soon convinced, to rephrase one old saw, that C2 is defined by the senior man 
present.” In this case, it appears the terms Command and Control are often justified by 
the writer of the work instead of the senior man present.
As previously mentioned, Command and Control is viewed uniquely by each 
individual or organization depending on their perspective. Many believe that the modem 
term ‘Command and Control’ came about with the issuance of DoD Directive S-5100.30 
in October 1962, entitled “Concept of Operations o f the Worldwide Military Command 
and Control Systems (WWMCCS).” This directive set overall policies for the integration 
of the various Command and Control elements that were rapidly coming into being, 
stressing five essential system characteristics: survivability, flexibility, compatibility, 
standardization, and economy. The WWMCCS directive, though revised and declassified 
in December 1971 as DoDD 5100.30, remained in effect despite the fact that Lieutenant 
General Albert J. Edmonds, Director, Defense Information Systems Agency, officially 
deactivated the WWMCCS Inter-computer Network (WIN) on August 30, 1996 (Curts, 
2008).
As is evident, this is a very system centered approach. It harkens back to a 
concept of cybernetics. The theory that implies if  communication, control, and feedback 
were well managed, the synergy o f human and computer systems would maximize the 
whole and, by default, render our forces superior to those of our enemies.
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Another current definition in Western military thought is that defined in U. S. Joint 
Chiefs o f Staff (JCS) Publication 1-02, Command and Control is “the exercise of 
authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the 
accomplishment of the mission” (p. 40). Command and Control, also called C2 
(Department o f Defense, 2001), is performed through an arrangement of personnel, 
equipment, communications, facilities and procedures employed by a commander in 
planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the 
accomplishment o f the mission.
Under Title 10, the warfighters o f the US are the regional combatant commanders 
and not the JCS. The role of the JCS is to advise the President o f the United States. It is 
easy to pick out words that quickly correlate back to that function.
The NATO definition is:
Control: The exercise o f authority and direction by a designated commander over 
assigned forces in the accomplishment of the force’s mission. The functions of 
command and control are performed through an arrangement of personnel, 
equipment, communications, facilities and procedures which are employed by a 
commander in planning, directing, coordinating and controlling forces in the 
accomplishment of his mission. (NATO, 2008, p.2-C-14)
The NATO term arrangement could describe the political need to carry out any specified 
military mission defined by a group of countries, or even a single service specific 
definition as defined below United States Air Force:
C2 is the exercise o f authority and direction by a properly designated commander 
over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. C2
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includes both the process by which the commander decides what action is to be 
taken and the systems that facilitate planning, execution, and monitoring of those 
actions. Specifically, C2 includes the battlespace management process of 
planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations. (JP 1-02) 
(United States Air Force, 2011, p.47)
The role of any US service is to organize, train, and equip. One can glimpse those 
missions in the words selected. These differing perspectives define C2 as a complex 
system and synthesis o f the seminal writers about complex systems (Beer, 1979,1981, 
1985; Flood & Carson, 1993; Jackson, 1991; Klir, 1991) validates that multiple, and 
possibly divergent views, will continue to appear from the various C2 stakeholder 
perspectives.
2.2 EMANCIPATION
In 1991, Flood and Jackson defined the philosophical support for CST as 
“emancipation,” meaning “much broader dedication to human improvement” (p. 120). In 
1995, the Command and Control Research Program (CCRP), within the Office of the 
Secretary o f Defense, was created. During the 1970s, the Office of Naval Research and 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology brought together interested researchers to 
exchange ideas on C2 and the impact of information revolution on the process. The first 
few conference meetings started out with only a few non-U.S. participants. Now more 
than 20 nations contribute.
Within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Nil), CCRP focuses 
upon improving both the state of the art and the state of the practice of Command and 
Control (C2), which enhances DoD's understanding of the national security implications
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of the Information Age. The CCRP pursues a broad program of research and analysis in 
Command and Control (C2) theory, doctrine, applications, systems, the implications of 
emerging technology, and C2 experimentation. It also develops new concepts for C2 in 
joint, combined, and coalition operations in the context o f both traditional and non- 
traditional missions (Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)).
Key C2 concepts pioneered by CCRP include:
• Network Centric Warfare (NCW)/Network-Centric Operations (NCO)/ 
Network Enabled Capability (NEC)
• Power to the Edge
• Co-Evolution of Mission Capability Packages
• Domains: Physical, Informational, Cognitive, Social
• Effects Based Operations (EBO) and Effects Based Approach to 
Operations (EBAO)
• Campaigns of Experimentation (concept-based)
•  C2 Approach Space
• C2 Maturity Models
• Model-Experiment-Model Paradigm
• Agility: Robust, Resilient, Responsive, Innovative, Flexible, and Adaptive
•  C2 and Complexity
•  Focus and Convergence
One o f the seminal authors on current command and control is Dr. Richard E. 
Hayes (Alberts & Hayes, 1995, 2001,2002, 2006; Hayes et al„ 1993, 2001, 2006) (See 
Appendix B for the results of an interview with this seminal author).
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2.2.1 Network Centric Warfare (NCW)
Network Centric Warfare is the best term developed to date to describe the way 
we will organize and fight in the Information Age. The Chief o f Naval Operations, 
Admiral Jay Johnson, has called it “a fundamental shift from platform-centric warfare.” 
(Johnson, 1998) NCW is defined as an information superiority-enabled concept of 
operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision 
makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed o f command, higher 
tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self­
synchronization. In essence, NCW translates information superiority into combat power 
by effectively linking knowledgeable entities in the battlespace. (Alberts, 1999).
2.2.2 Edge Power
The term “edge” derives from the recent book entitled Power to the Edge (Alberts 
& Hayes, 2003), which depicts new ways o f organizing military forces and of enabling 
more powerful warfare by leveraging shared awareness and dynamic knowledge. The 
central premise is that power (i.e., the capability to accomplish intended actions) needs to 
flow from the "centers" o f military organizations to their "edges." Using this metaphor, 
center refers principally to headquarters (e.g., where decision-makers request information 
from the field), and edge refers principally to front lines (e.g., where combatants— at the 
pointy end of the metaphorical spear—fight wars). The concept clearly involves more 
than simply realigning organization charts and reallocating decision rights. People at the 
edges of organizations must be aware of command intent, know how to accomplish tasks, 
activities, and processes, and be able to self-organize and self-synchronize to achieve the 
desired effects (Center for Edge Power, 2006).
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2.2.3 Effects Based Operations (EBO)
Effects Based Operations (EBO) is an approach to planning, executing, and 
assessing military operations with an explicit focus on effects as opposed to targets or 
even objectives. Many people may ask: i s n ’t this the way we have always fought wars? 
Didn’t we always focus on the effects we want to achieve?’ The answer is yes. 
Commanders certainly always consider effects when planning and fighting wars. What 
are currently lacking but are in development are the automated tools to build and assess 
plans that link objectives to effects (including direct, indirect, physical, and behavioral 
effects, and the mechanisms through which effects are achieved), and then to link the 
effects and mechanisms to specific actions which need to be taken.
As stated, EBO is not a funded Program of Record (PoR) led by an office in the 
Pentagon; it is a mindset, a way o f thinking in as much as it is a new methodology. EBO 
supports all mission types from Humanitarian Relief Operations all the way to Major 
Theater War. EBO could utilize lethal and non-lethal force such as information warfare.
EBO offers and requires an approach to modeling the enemy as a system, or, 
more specifically, a System-of-Systems (SoS). Enemy Center o f Gravity (COG) or 
National Elements o f Value (NEV) modeling can achieve this. We use the Warden COG 
analysis model and the Barlow NEV model to do this. What is important for EBO is to 
address not only COG analysis but also cross-cog analysis. For example, what effects 
does one COG such as infrastructure have on another COG, such as system essentials or 
leadership? EBO offers economy of force by specifying both dependencies and 
interactions between various target systems/COGs and mechanisms (McCrabb, 2001).
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2.2.4 Disruptive Innovation and Experimentation
The book Information Age Transformation: Getting to a 21st Century Military 
(Alberts, 1996) acknowledges the fundamental obstacle to C2 progress: “Military 
organizations are, by their very nature, resistant to change” (p. 1). This is due in no small 
part to the fact that the cost of error is exceedingly high. When properly conceived and 
executed, campaigns o f experimentation strike the proper balance between innovation 
and risk. As a result, organizations are able to embrace new concepts, organizational 
forms, approaches to Command and Control processes, and technologies. In other words, 
they are able to accomplish disruptive (transformational) change with an acceptable level 
of risk. Given the nature o f military institutions, achieving the proper balance is not likely 
to occur without developing a broad-based understanding of, and a significantly 
improved ability to conduct, campaigns o f experimentation (Alberts & Hayes, 2005).
2.2.5 C2 Maturity Model
NATO Network-Enabled Capability (NEC) has developed a Command and 
Control (C2) Maturity Model (N2C2M2), which is designed to provide guidance for the 
assessment of C2 approaches and capabilities under the conditions o f Network Centric 
Warfare (NCW). N2C2M2 supports military organizations to determine where they are 
and where they want to go regarding C2 capabilities relative to those prescribed by the 
NCW vision (Alberts & Hayes, 2007). It identifies important milestones that nations must 
reach on the road to higher C2 maturity when seeking to contribute to NATO NEC by 
developing requisite C2 approaches and capabilities. It provides a framework that can 
assess the C2 capabilities of individual nations and collections of nations and other 
coalition partners. There are five steps in the maturity model:
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1) Conflicted C2: In this, only existing C2 is exercised by the individual 
contributors over their own forces or sub-elements.
2) De-conflicted C2: In order for entities to avoid negative cross impacts of 
their intents, plans, or actions they need to be able to recognize potential 
conflicts and attempt to resolve them by partitioning the problem space as 
a function of, for example, geography, function, and/or time. This involves 
limited information sharing and limited interactions.
3) Coordinated C2: In this, overall C2 effectiveness increases by seeking 
mutual support for intent, developing relationships and links between and 
among entities’ plans, and actions to reinforce or enhance effects with 
some initial pooling o f non-organic resources.
4) Collaborative C2: In this, significant synergies are developed by 
negotiating and establishing shared intent and a single shared plan, 
establishing or reconfiguring roles, coupling actions, rich sharing of non- 
organic resources, and some pooling of organic resources.
5) Agile C2: This is built on Collaborative C2, and is distinguished by the 
entities’ capability to self-synchronize, as well as the ability to recognize 
which approach to C2 is appropriate for the current situation, and to adopt 
that approach in a dynamic manner (Huber, 2008).
2.3 PLURALISM (INFORMATION FLOW)
Before the age of computers, we maintained information on paper. That paper 
became the object of a transformational workflow. In an Informational Technology (IT) 
environment, transformational workflow transpires between loosely coupled information
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systems and it is sometimes difficult to determine how humans transform input 
information into output information. A good example of the challenge in understanding 
how loosely coupled IT systems and humans interoperate is the Common Operational 
Picture (COP). Examination of a complete theater COP architecture diagram is similar to 
looking at a picture o f the results of a 500 lb. bomb hitting a spaghetti factory; many little 
straight lines lying all over the place. Information is collected by a plethora of different 
equipment by organizations that are moving, sometimes on the ground or water or often 
airborne, or rotating into or out o f theater. The raw data are fussed and correlated, 
transmitted across various non-harmonious physical layers using a surfeit o f differing 
ports and protocols. The latent results are sometimes incomplete and always hard to 
validate as a total accurate representation of reality. The ensuing information flow pipes 
into the AOC. The result is that the actual COP is not the technical image displayed on a 
wall for all see, but rather a communal concept that each individual perceives about 
external ongoing reality.
The origins o f Information Theory (IT) lie in C.E. Shannon's “A Mathematical 
Theory o f Communication,” published in 1948. Shannon (1948) proposed entropy as a 
measure of information, choice, and uncertainty. Entropy figures into such diverse 
communities as biology, decision theory, and thermodynamics. Bell Telephone 
Laboratories (in which Shannon worked) and Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) expanded on Shannon's theory. Shannon never used the phrase Information Theory 
in a paper, but his emphasis on the term information helped coin the phase. The phrase 
implies that one could understand, study, and reduce to a math formula something as 
vague as information. Written for the communication field. Shannon’s concepts
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developed in the late nineteen-forties soon slipped into the popular press. The initial 
enthusiasm developed into seminars, leading to classes producing graduate students that 
became the field’s first practitioners. MIT’s first field workers have cross-pollinated 
disciplines as diverse as Computer Science, Electrical Engineering, and Mathematics.
For all fields, including C2, Shannon and his followers mathematically proved there are 
ways of encoding information that would allow flow up to a limit without any errors. The 
bad news is that after one reaches that limit, no matter how much money one spends on 
error correction equipment and/or process, one will lose some information.
Shannon’s theory demonstrates how information relates to uncertainty, which can 
be given as a function. The amount of information, bits, is equal to the base 2 logarithm 
of the inverse o f the probability:
Hi= Log 2 1/Pi
where Hi is the amount o f information and Pi is the probability o f occurrence o f i. Using a 
formal mathematical construct for information, we can remove the human subject 
constraint concerning any ‘value’ o f one generic informational blob (text-string) as 
compared to another.
Shannon’s research provides the foundational work in understanding information 
flow. To dive into the depths o f inquiry about C2 information flow, one must understand 
other seminal authors’ works, o f which there are at least three. I liken Shannon’s 
Information Flow concept to the structure o f an arch, in which three building blocks are 
used to create the final product: cornerstone (Conant, 1976), arch stone (Ashby, 1956), 
and key stone (Beer, 1979). The cornerstone is the first to be set; the arch is a truncated
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wedge that forms part o f the arch ring; and the key is a central wedge-shaped stone that 
locks the parts together.
The comer stone of this work is Conant's (1976) law of partitioning of 
information rates, which addresses the allocation of total information processing ability to 
different tasks. Conant divides information in at least three categories. The first category 
is blocking of information, i.e., effort expended on information of no ‘value' that may 
even damage the system, and which should not influence overall system activities. The 
second category is processing of information that should influence the system's behavior 
as it directly influences system output. The third category Conant posits is coordination. 
When a task is too large to handle by a single part o f the system, it must be broken into 
manageable parts. Fracturing information flow creates the need for coordination. 
Determining the correct balance between work distribution and coordination is the 
lynchpin of efficient information transformation in which parties in the processing chain 
decide what they should do and what others inside and outside the AOC or any C2 should 
do.
Continuing the metaphor of how other writers’ works need to blend into 
Shannon’s (1948) core information flow concepts to bring vitality in C2 understanding, 
the arch stone o f my work is Ashby’s (1956) Law of Requisite Variety, in which a 
general law determines the capacity o f a control node (regulator). In an information 
processing system like the AOC, the requirement on the regulator is information 
processing capacity as a communication channel, as shown by Casti (1985).
The key stone that holds the entire C2 Information Flow concepts together is 
Beer's (1979) proposition that complex systems be managed by regulation in which the
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different parts control their local milieu. Local control method o f management should be 
considered as the system reaches a Pareto-optimum through the ‘interactions' played by 
all the different constantly changing sub-organizations. Beer’s (1979) concept fits nicely 
into AOC systems, where work is distributed among five core divisions and any number 
of cross-hatched specialty teams and no single person has control over the entire system.
2.4 THE MEANING OF INFORMATION
The term information, in its current usage, has no universally recognized 
definition. Shapiro and Varian (1999) state that “essentially anything that can be digitized 
- encoded as a stream of bits - is information” (p. 3). Shapiro and Varian’s 
characterization fails to capture the aspect of information associated with transmission 
from sender to receiver. Conversely, Shannon’s definition does not include the transition 
of meaning. Taken to the infinite, Shannon's concept attributes a larger amount of 
information to a random sequence of letters than it does to a sequence o f letters that 
compose a word. Weaver, in The Mathematical Theory o f  Communication, (Shannon & 
Weaver, 1949) reinforces that Shannon’s information “must not be confused with 
meaning” (p. 117). Machines can pass a great amount o f information; humans as 
communication channels are extremely limited.
Communication channel capacity is very low when humans converse. Our 
bandwidth is less than 100 bits/second (Norretranders, 1991). Norretranders' concept 
posits that a sender starts with an idea that he wants to communicate. He consolidates this 
idea in language through models and metaphors. If the receiver shares the same models 
and metaphors, he or she will comprehend the information and its underlying associations 
by mentally expanding it. A good example of the success or failure o f the mental model-
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sharing concept would be when two people use a shared second language to try to 
communicate abstract concepts. In Diagnosing the System fo r  Organizations, Beer (1985) 
stresses that a message may distort at any location within the system. He points out that 
the transduction; i.e., when the message is translated from the type of message sent in the 
communication channel to the kind o f message understood by the receiving end, is the 
most vulnerable spot. Even in a paper-based system, its recipient may not correctly 
understand a message, though both parties are fluent in the same language. In an IT 
world, where parties may or may not share a common presentation layer, user application 
incongruities in understanding can quickly arise. The interpretation of the meaning or 
underlying value of the information has a direct effect on control/regulator functions. The 
value of information is limited if the recipient cannot interpret the totality o f what the 
sender is attempting to communicate. For this research, information is defined as factoids 
(human readable word strings).
2.5 DEFINING SYSTEM FRAGMENTATION
System Fragmentation is the “ugly baby” in the room that is C2; very few want to 
think intelligently about it. System theory points to the fact that all systems, as they 
change over time, will move in the direction of fragmentation and differentiation (Kast & 
Rosenzeig, 1985). When differentiation is one’s strategy for success, fragmentation will 
happen. In natural systems, we see this process happening in bees or ants or in the 
evolution of an entire species. In man-designed systems, the process is replicated; one 
need only observe the many different one-off, spinoffs, rip-offs and other-off s of any 
truly uniquely beneficial design, product, service or concept. System theory also tells us 
that all systems will experience a counterbalancing imperative to seek integration and
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convergence to cover the common principles that underline their functioning. (Katz & 
Kahn, 1978). System fragmentation/specialization can have benefits, like lower nodal 
cost, but at the same time, it brings a range o f complicating problems. System 
fragmentation is the “ugly baby” in C2, not because it going to happen, but because no 
one knows how best to management it in a knowledge age. Here are two classic military 
examples: All militaries can divide into organizational blocks, and when the blocks fail 
to function as expected, the organization can reorganize, rearm, and reequip as needed.
In the Information Age, with massive amounts of static infrastructure required to move 
data, will any new organizational structure be more than deck chairs on the Titanic? 
Industrial Age systems were divided along the specialty functions; the army got the tanks 
and the navy got the ships. Should that same philosophy be used in knowledge intensive 
management organization? In the AOC, should each o f the five divisions, or maybe even 
all o f the specialty teams, have their own systems, or be supported by multiple systems? 
If a single large system, it should be remembered that in 1991 a single mistyped character 
in a single line of code knocked 12 million customers o f AT&T offline.
The AOC systems are divided along two primary system fragmentation lines.
The first fragmentation line is formed by the Management Information Systems (MIS) 
that at their underpinning rely on commercial standards, and are often defined as 
Commercial-of-the-Shelf (COTS). The other line of fragmentation is defined by C2 
systems that are built on govemment/Mil-Standards and are often defined as 
Govemment-of-the Shelf (GOTS). An example o f an MIS system would be e-mail and 
example of a Mil-STD system would be Link -16. Over time, many AOC C2 systems 
have acquired at their core COTS technology. An example would be Theater Battle
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Management Core System (TBMCS). TBMCS is used to build the ATO (a military 
standard message), but has an Oracle database to store the data and sends the ATO to 
other units using Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) (a COTS standard).
The AOC can be divided in many different ways to be observed, as can any 
complex system. One way to look at the AOC is to quarter the AOC by systems. The 
upper left quarter would be systems that provide Situational Awareness (mostly GOTS). 
The upper right would be systems that produce messages like the ATO and ACO (mostly 
GOTS). The lower left would be systems that provide/produce Intelligence (again mostly 
GOTS). The lower right would be made up o f the explosion of COTS products from 
web-pages, to e-mail, to VTC, to digital phones, and the most newfangled toy.








Figure 9. The AOC by Systems
In the Information Age, and based on history, the number and functions o f COTS systems 
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Figure 10. Fragmentation of various Systems (Kuefler, 2012)
In the paper, “US Army Information Technology Management” by Casazza, 
Hendrix, Lederle, and Rouge (2012), the authors argue convincingly that the very 
structure o f a US military organization inhibits adaption o f new technologies:
[T]he U.S. Army remains the most technologically sophisticated military force in 
the world, extraordinarily efficient and effective at its mission to defend and
protect the peace and security of the United States, its national interests, and
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objectives. However, when attempting to integrate the rapid advancements made 
in information technology, it has invested considerable resources with little 
success. As argued in this paper, this is not the result of technological issues, but 
rather ones of the convergence of the technological and the social. The very 
organizational structure that has served the Army well in consistently delivering 
on its mission through frequent turnover, extreme circumstances, and immense 
size is also at direct odds with the type of organizational structure embodied by 
information technology, (p. 3)
Rigid rules, parallel hierarchies, systemic division of labor and authority, and elaborate 
processes do well for establishing and maintaining civilian control of a continent- 
spanning organization which may be called upon to fulfill dangerous missions in 
unknown circumstances, and in which new personnel may be rotated frequently. 
However, the benefit o f IT as defined here, is to transform an organization, rewrite those 
rules, and make them constantly adaptive to new circumstances. System fragmentation 
and the corresponding knowledge fragmentation will take place; I believe that the 
fragmentation can be modeled and measured to determine how that fragmentation affects 
the overall man-machine system of the AOC. For this dissertation, I modeled system 
fragmentation by increasing the number o f webpages per site and decreasing the trust in 
the information available on each individual webpage.
2.5 HUMAN LIMITATIONS
Humans are self-organizing, problem solving creatures. If one looks closely at 
operators as a group, great variability is evident in how each operator performs his 
perceived task. Some reach the leadership asymptotic performance approaching
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perfection, but many others do not. Aristotle posited four levels of abstraction that 
operators use to interpret and explain their reality. Aristotle’s four levels of generalization 
about function and cause are: formal, material, efficient, and final. At the formal level, a 
light switch (function) will turn a light bulb on if one moved the switch to the ‘up’ 
position (cause). At the material level, the light came on (function) because a pair o f ‘hot’ 
electrical contacts moved to close a circuit (cause). At the efficient level, the 
incandescent filament illuminated (function) due to current flowing to the bulb (cause).
At the final level, someone turned the light on (function) because it was getting dark 
(cause). Human short-term working memory ranges from approximately 7 + or -  2 
objects at any given time. The higher the abstraction an operator uses, the lower the 
number o f objects about which he must think. For example, it is easier to think about a 
car then it is to think about the parts in a drive train, or all the parts in an engine, or what 
is happening in each cylinder on each stroke. Moving up the abstraction level reduces 
workload and facilitates transmission of concepts to other individuals operating at a 
similar level. Accurate higher-level abstractions form in formal training or through 
experience as one-to-one and many-to-one mappings are made. One does not need to 
understand what is going on under the hood when a car makes a ‘funny’ sound. The 
driver and the mechanic do not possess a one-to-one mapping of function to cause, and 
trying to communicate to the mechanic that lower level detail soon becomes nearly 
impossible, meaning the mechanic and the non-knowledgeable driver never achieve 
successful communication and each must ineffectually move forward. The mechanic’s 
job would be easier if  the driver used words like the ‘the mechanical lifters are knocking 
under a heavy load.’ The driver would not be so shocked at the bill if  the mechanic had
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not had to explore three or four possible problems before stumbling into the actual issue. 
Just because two people share a common root language does not mean each participant 
achieves an exchange of ideas. Higher levels of abstraction are homomorphs o f lower 
levels. In other words, a high level generalization preserves the causal relationship, but 
with loss of detail. For this research, I will extract information only to the highest level. 
Differing level of abstraction of concepts point to why a strict quantitative analysis 
approach does not provide complete understanding on many C2 issues.
2.6 THE SYSTEM
The AOC is not the only command node in the human condition that relies on an 
artificial representation of reality to make decisions and provide life-altering outputs. The 
operations center of a nuclear power plant (NPP) or any other directing organizational 
node takes from reality a subset of facts and begins the decision making process based on 
them. The challenge in the cognitive organizational design process is to recognize and 
anticipate ‘facts’ that are appropriate, and, if they are captured, whether they create in the 
mind of the operator an accurate representation of reality.
Current AOC organizational realities contain (1) a high degree o f technological 
complexity to manage massive amounts of data, (2) non-linear, knowledge-intensive 
work, (3) changing battlespace influencing work system effectiveness, and (4) turbulent 
mission requirements. This predicament is a result of the AOC attempt to monitor and 
control everything within a complex system scattered over thousands to hundreds of 
thousands of square miles. Therefore, Air Power reality has many open-system 
characteristics. To attempt to capture some open-system characteristics o f the AOC,
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organization elements outside the AOC will make up a sufficient number o f ELICIT 
agents.
2.6.1 Shannon’s (1948) Concept
As stated previously, any electronically stored, transmitted, or recorded data is 
neither information nor knowledge. Humans supply context to these mathematically 
defined and physically manipulated voltages. At the same time, the language of data1 
knowledge/ information can convey an appropriate exchange of authenticity. Any 
military Corps or above organization, like an AOC, often use electronic data encapsulated 
in language to exchange understanding and meanings with other war-fighters and should 
organizationally be considered a knowledge management entity. Humans do not 
exchange information in 0 ’s and 1 ’s, but it is valid to use information flow theory to 
elucidate what happening inside the AOC.
I provide Shannon's (1948) general concept of a communication system in





M e s s a g e
M e s s a g e
R eceiver D e s t in a t io nT r a n s m i t t e r
In f o r m a t io n
S o u r c e
N o ise  S o u r c e
Figure 11. Shannon's (1948) General Concept of a Communication System
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Shannon and Norbert Wiener's (an early MIT collaborator) measure for the 
amount o f information in a message is the amount of uncertainty it removes. Hence, to 
determine the amount of information a recipient receives in a message. Shannon (1949) 
starts with all possible messages that could have arrived. Assume that the number of 
possible messages is W and let p =1/W. Further, let pi denote the probability that message pi 
is transmitted. Shannon defines the amount of information as information entropy, which is 
calculated as
I  = - k L  pi log pi
with k = 1 and 2 as the base of the logarithm. The result is the quantity of information in 
bits in which one bit is defined as the choice between two alternatives. If the expected 
message is a character o f the English alphabet, the other 25 characters represent the 
uncertainty removed. If all characters are equally probable (pi=l/26) and I convert to 2 as 
the base o f the logarithm, I get
/  = -  1 /In 2 * In 1/26 = 4,7 bit 
as the amount of information in one character.
Shannon and Wiener's (1949) mathematical definitions differ in that Shannon 
multiplies the sum with minus one, whereas Wiener does not. However, as pointed out by 
Ashby (1948), when one is interested in the gain in information, the sign makes no 
difference. One must meet two requirements before measuring Shannon-information. 
First, there must be an uncertainty—the question must precede the answer. Second, the 
uncertainty must be measurable. A drawback o f Shannon-information is that it bears no 
direct reference to meaning. However, applying the concept more loosely, one may read 
meaning in ‘uncertainty removed.' One reason for using Shannon-information is that it
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fits nicely into the theory of sets and is applicable to the ‘set-ness’ o f a system. 
Furthermore, it is suitable in discussing the role o f information used for control. While 
Shannon (1948) developed the measure for studying communication systems, Wiener 
developed it to study control of systems. Shannon and Weaver (1949) define that it is 
appropriate to use the volume of factoids moving through the system at any time as a 
change measurement mechanism.
Sommerhoff (1950) specifies five variables that can represent the macro air power
system:
Figure 12. Modification of Sommerhoff s Five Variables (Summerhoff, 1950).
(1) where Z is all events that may occur— intended, untended, some good, some bad 
(Set Z in Ashby’s (1967) reformulation in terms o f set theory.);
(2) the set G, a sub-set of Z, consisting of ‘good’ events, those that one perceives will 
result in favorable outcomes;
(3) the set R of events in the AOC  and the resulting outputs;
(4) the set S o f events in the rest o f the open system, which is reality (e.g., position of 
aircraft and amount of fuel in their tanks);
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(5) the set D of primary disturbers (Sommerhoff s "coenetic variable’); those that 
cause the events in the system S, tend to drive the outcomes out of G: (e.g. 
weather, higher headquarters, emergencies); and
(6) this formulation has withstood 60 years’ scrutiny and covers a majority of cases.
It is also rigorous (Ashby, 1967) and each value (Figure 12) evokes the next:
o : D—>S 
p: D—>R 
\\i: S x R—>Z
then ‘R’ is a good regulator (for goal G, given D, etc., 0  and \j/)’ is equivalent to
P c  W '  (G )]0- 
to which I must add the obvious condition that
p p ' c l c p ' p
to ensure that p is an actual mapping, and not the empty set. In addition, there is no 
restriction to laniary.
The criterion of success of the AOC is not whether the outcome, after each 
interaction o f S and R, is somewhere within G, but whether the outcomes, on some 
numerical scale, have a root-mean-square vectoring toward zero.
There are two basic methods by which the AOC can inject control inputs in 
attempting to influence reality (Z). One method is provision o f error-control inputs or 
cause-control inputs. In terms of Operational Air Power, one could define Error-Control 
inputs as the number of bombers available to send based on their circular probability of 
error (CEP). CEP has decreased from that extent in World War I, and the number o f 
bomb-laden aircraft sent to destroy any given target has proportionally decreased. The
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other method is cause-control input. Higher biological organisms have evolved to use 
more effectively information about the causes (at D) as the source and determiner of their 
actions. An Air Power example of cause-control is if a warfighter is assigned airborne 
Close Air Support (X-CAS) and there is no movement at the primary target, the 
warfighter can be rolled into a secondary target. Error-control is a less effective method 
of air power execution as the entropy of the outcome Z cannot be reduced to zero: its best 
success can only be partial. Sommerhoff s (1950) macro model provides the conceptual 
underpinning that although the Operational C2 model does not achieve error-control, it 
does use cause-control as a recognized throttling technique.
2.6.2 Conant
Conant (1976) used the information theory to analyze real world systems. Conant 
considers a system S as an ordered set o f variables S =  {XT X 2 .. .  ,X,J. Those variables in
S that can be directly observed from its environment constitute output variables. The set 
o f these output variables is denoted So = {XI1 X 2 , -  ,Xk j, with 1 'V'n. The remaining 
variables within S are internal variables, denoted as Sint. Hence, S = {Sinll So}. LetE 
(the environment) denote all relevant variables outside S.
{ S i n t , S 0  }
Figure 13. Visual depiction of Conant’s Information Flow Concept
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Conant (1976) employed the idea of using information theory to gain 
understanding o f systems, although Brillouin (1962) had already applied a similar idea 
with respect to scientific reasoning. Conant used the theory to better understand real- 
world systems, although he admitted that "...there are obvious dangers in applying 
information theory, designed for use under severe mathematical constraints o f stationarity 
and ergodicity, to real-world systems thus not constrained" (Conant, 1976, p. 63). 
However, the justification lies in the fact that instead of being content to say nothing 
about information, a far more preferable course is to try to use results from a formal 
theory by judicious interpretation and generalization (Conant, 1976).
In his book, Alternate Realities: Mathematical Models o f  Nature and Man, about 
mathematical model building, Casti (1989) comments on the lack o f consideration of 
such basic questions in the following manner:
As noted by Rosen (1986), in dealing with the idea o f a natural system, we must 
necessarily touch on some basic philosophical questions o f both an ontological 
and epistemological character. This is unavoidable in any case and must be 
addressed at the outset o f a work as this, because our tacit assumptions in these 
areas determine the character of our science. It’s true that many scientists find an 
explicit consideration of such matters irritating, just as many working 
mathematicians dislike discussions of the foundations o f mathematics. 
Nevertheless, it is well to recall the remark of David Hawkins (1989),
“Philosophy may be ignored but not escaped; and those who ignore most escape 
least.” (p. 1-3)
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Conant’s model is regarded as a useful tool for describing human information 
processing, especially for the information flow of diagnosis tasks that are relatively static. 
Based on the information theory, the amount of information is simply equal to the base 2 
logarithm of the inverse of the probability:
Hi = Log2 1/pi
where Hi is the amount of information pi and is the probability o f the occurrence of an 
event. The average information conveyed by a series of events with different probabilities 
is computed as
n





and p i  probability o f occurrence o f event j.
Equation (1) is the same as the mathematical definition o f entropy in statistical 
mechanics. Information relates to uncertainty. An important characteristic o f (1) is that 
when events are not equally likely, H will always be less than its value when the same 
events are equally probable.
The amount by which two variables are related (i.e., they are not statistically 
independent) is measured by the transmission between them, T(Xi: X2), denoted as and 
defined through probabilities, or by:
T(Xi: X2) = H (Xi) + H (X2) -  H (X,:X2) ( 13)
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H ( X a , X b ) denotes the total information corresponding to the combined occurrence of A 
and B. The transmission is a measure o f relatedness between variables, which accounts 
for its usefulness in system science. T ( X a , X b ) falls in the interval
[0, min,{H(XA), H(XB)}], 
being 0 if and only if  A and B are statistically independent and maximum if and only if 
one variable determines the other.
Conant (1076) considered a system S = { Xi, X2, .. .Xn}. Those variables in S  that 
can be directly observed from its environment constitute output variables. The set of 
these output variables is denoted as S0 = { Xi, X2, ...Xk}, with k <1 < n. The remaining 
variables within S  are internal variables, denoted as Sint. Hence, S =  { Sint, S 0} . E denotes 
all relevant variables outside S, namely environmental variables. Next, Conant obtained 
an expression for the total information F  (in bits) as a measure o f the total processing 
activity within S.
F=Xy=1H(Xj)= F t +  Fb + Fc+Fn 
The different constituents o f F  are defined as follows:
Throughput Rate Ft = T(E:So)
Blockage Rate F b =  T S0(E :  Sim ) =  T ( E :  S )  -  T ( E :  S 0)
Coordination Rate Fc = T(Xi, X2, ...Xn) = 2 ^  H(Xj)- H(X,, X2, ...X n)
Noise Rate Fn = H E( S )  =  H ( E ,S )  -  H ( E )
Ha (B) denotes the amount of information in A, conditional on B; it is the amount of 
information in A when B is known.
The total information flow for a system is expressed as
f -KLi «
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where /: a subsystem of a system S.
The total information flow in system S' is represented by the sum of the total flow 
for the subsystems. The total flow F  is also the sum of the entropy of the individual 
variables. It represents the total activity in S  if inter-variable relationships are ignored. 
Conant also pointed out that one could view F a s  the total amount o f ‘computing’ going 
on in S. Subsequently, the total activity can be expressed by the sum of four terms (or 
activities), that is, throughput, blockage, coordination, and noise. The throughput Ft 
measures the input-output flow rate o f S, or the number o f bits per step passing through S  
as a communication channel. The blockage Fb is the amount of information about the 
input E that is blocked within S and not allowed to affect the output.
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Table 2. Constituents o f Total Information F
Formula Result
F,= T ( E : S 0) Throughput Rate
Fb = Tso (E : Sint)
= T ( E : S ) - T ( E : S 0 )
Blockage Rate
Fc = T ( X i : X 2 : ... : Xn )
= H (XI,  X2 ......Xn)
Coordination Rate
Fn = He (S) Noise Rate
= H ( E , S) -  H (E)






Figure 14. Conant's (1976) Model, Describing Blocking, Throughput and Coordination
The coordination Fc represents a measure o f the total relatedness between all the 
variables in S. The noise Fn represents the amount o f internally-generated information in 
the process. The dimension of these terms is bits.
57
• Ft is the throughput rate and is a measure of the relatedness between input and output, 
the term transmission engineers wish to optimize where S is a transmission channel.
• Fb is the blockage rate and represents the effort needed by S to block non-relevant 
information (e.g., if S is a system that from a sequence of natural numbers only 
presents the prime numbers at its output, then S internally blocks all the non-prime 
numbers).
• Fe is the coordination rate and represents the amount o f information processing 
needed to obtain a coordinated action among the system variables (i.e., subsystems) 
o f S.
• Fn is the noise rate and reflects the amount of information in S that is not reflected in 
(i.e., dependent on) the input to S; in case o f the transmission channel this is the noise 
present at the channel.
Information also relates to uncertainty. The transmitter may send certain 
messages. Before the arrival o f a message, the receiver will be uncertain as to which 
message they will receive. After arrival o f the message, less uncertainty (possibly zero) is 
left. The difference between the two amounts corresponds to the information in the 
message. This information is expressed in bits. Let B denote the situation before the 
arrival of the message and let A denote the situation after arrival; then H(B,A) denotes 
the information in the message. In general H(A/B) denotes the amount o f information in 
A, conditional on B; it is the amount of information in A when B is known.
T(A:B) is the transmission between A and B and is a measure o f the relatedness 
of A and B. It is defined as:
T(A :B) = H(A) - H(A1B) = H(B) - H(BIA)
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It is zero if A and B are independent and maximum if one determines the other. In 
the case o f a noiseless transmission channel:
T(A :B) = H(A) = H(B)
A simple decomposition rule will be used. Let H(A,B) denote the total 
information corresponding to the combined occurrence of A and B. Then the following 
rule holds:
H(A,B) = H(A) + H(BIA) = H(B) + H(AIB)
This expression states that the information in the combination of A and B is the 
information in one of these plus the remaining information in the other when the first is 
known. With these basic notions, the different constituents of F can be defined as follows.
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Table 3. Information Flow
Formula Result
F , =  T  ( E  : S o) Relatedness (transmission) between the
environment and the output
Transmission between the environment
Fb =  T  ( E  : Sint/ so) and the internal variables when the output
is known
Fc = T ( X i : X 2 : ... : X n ) Transmission between the variables o f S
Fn = H (S/E) Information in S when E is known
Conant's (1976) work validates that data movement through an organization can be 
measured and quantified over time and against organizational structure.
2.6.3 Ashby’s (1956) Law
In any system, the various entities and relationships that make up the structure 
may be in different conditions, and the state of the system is the totality o f all these 
various conditions. A systems variety is the number of different states it can be in Ashby 
(1956); similarly, there is a variety in the system's input and output. Hence, one may 
interpret variety as a measure of one aspect o f systemic complexity (Beer, 1985).
One of the arch stones in our analogous arch is Ashby’s (1956) Law o f Requisite 
Variety, which establishes a relationship between the capacity o f a regulator and the 
controllability of a system.
Consider a system with a regulator R. Assume further that one wants the system 
to remain at a particular state. The system is under the influence of disturbances from its
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environment that threaten to drive the system away from its desired state. Ashby’s (1956) 
Law of Requisite Variety gives a minimum requirement on the R's capacity for the 
system to be controllable. According to Ashby's (1956) Law of Requisite Variety, for a 
system to be successfully controlled, the variety of the regulator must match the variety 
o f the disturbances: "only variety can destroy variety" (p. 207). Ashby's Law is not 
limited to any particular kind of system but is a general systemic principle. Assume that 
the system is in the desired state, and that a particular disturbance acts on the system. If R 
has a response for this particular disturbance, the desired state will be maintained in 
equilibrium. The system may be exposed to a variety of disturbances. Whether the 
desired state is maintained depends on the R providing responses that match these 
perturbations. The law may seem obvious and too simple to be true as a general law for 
controllability of any system; however, Casti (1985) shows how to relate the law to 
classical control theory for a single-input/single-output system and, furthermore, how that 
particular case may be generalized to a wider range of systems and situations.
The simplicity o f Ashby’s Law is, in a sense, deceptive. It prescribes a capacity of 
the regulator, but says nothing about how the regulator should be designed or how 
regulation is to be realized. The sine qua non o f Ashby’s Law is that it states 
controllability is a matter of dealing with variety. Beer (1984) applied the Law of 
Requisite Variety to management science: "Ashby's Law stands to management science 
as Newton's Laws stand to physics; it is central to a coherent account o f complexity 
control" (p. 7-25). Along the same line, Waelchli (1989) argues that Ashby's Law "is 
also a root law of organizations. Manifestations of the law are everywhere visible in 
historical and contemporary management theory and practice..." (p. 17).
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One may also measure variety as the logarithm of the number of states taken to 
any convenient base. If I multiply with the likelihood of each state occurring and the sum 
over all possible states is multiplied, it results in a measure that takes account of the 
different probabilities. One can obtain a measure of the same form as entropy and 
information. This measure of variety is entropic variety.
Consider a system that has to match the variety o f its environment. The ranges of 
states in this variety have different probabilities of occurring. The inherent entropic 
variety is defined as the ‘outspreadness’ o f this probability. Assume that knowledge is 
incomplete about the probability o f the various states occurring, and the estimate is 
always conservative, in that the determinacy of the system in terms o f the likelihood of 
the different possible states occurring is not overestimated. The perceived entropic 
variety is defined as the outspreadness assigned to the variety. The perceived entropic 
variety depends on knowledge about the system. It decreases as one obtains more 
information about the system and has as its limit the inherent entropic variety. The value 
of the information obtained depends on how much the uncertainty decreases.
The entropy in the system will change over time, but the variety o f the controlling 
and controlled system must equate. If the regulator system does not have requisite 
variety, it must strive to amplify its variety or attenuate the variety o f the controlled 
system. Therefore, a more complex system should become more manageable with 
improved availability and exchange of information. It is important to distinguish between 
that part of the variety which is caused by uncertainty and that caused by other properties 
of the system. The part caused by uncertainty represents a loss, whereas the part caused 
by other properties of the system can be used in a constructive way.
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2.6.4 Beer (1985) and Complexity
Often, IT systems are designed without a clear examination of the workings of the 
organization they are intended to serve. This lack of foresight can easily lead to the 
automation of processes that do not meet the needs of that organization. Few think very 
deeply about what makes organizations ‘tick.' This is probably because human beings are 
very easily conditioned to accept the social framework around them as though it was a 
part of the natural world.
The relation between complexity and controllability is that complex systems are 
harder to model and, as shown by Conant and Ashby (1970), the simplest regulator of a 
system is a model of the system it controls. This is not to say the model in the regulator 
must copy all the complex intricacies of the system. It suffices if the regulator has a 
model of the system’s behavior. In many instances, only a sub-set of all theoretically 
possible states o f the system and its environment are relevant for normal operation; thus, 
it is not necessary to model all theoretically possible behaviors o f the system. In the past 
few years, ‘complexity’ has become a major buzzword, or, as Edmonds (1997) nicely 
phrases it:
The label of ‘complexity’ often performs much the same role as that of the name 
o f a desirable residential area in a real estate agent’s advertisements. It is applied 
to many items beyond the original area but which are still somewhere in the 
vicinity. It thus helps in the item’s promotion by ensuring that a sufficient number 
of people will enquire into the details, but that does not mean that this wider use is 
ideal if one wishes to perform a more precise analysis, (p. 1)
Stafford Beer (1972) developed the Variable System Model (VSM) over a period 
o f more than thirty years as an aid to the practical process of diagnosing problems in
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human organizations and helping to improve their function. Beer believes that effective 
organizations should maximize the freedom of participants within the practical 
constraints o f the requirement for those organizations to fulfill their purpose. Beer intends 
VSM as an aid to the diagnosis of organizational problems and the subsequent process of 
organizational re-design. The redesigning process should use technology, particularly 
information technology, to assist in providing organizations with a nervous system that 
supports their aims, without the burden of bureaucracy. Software projects often involve 
the management of a very high degree o f complexity. All too frequently, complex issues 
are oversimplified to fit assumptions about how projects need to be structured. Once 
divided into ‘simple’ parts, work can proceed, with apparent progress. Unfortunately, 
when one attempts to integrate the parts near the end of the project, they discover that 
‘the sum of the parts does not equal the whole.’ Viable systems invariably contain a 
number of operations, each with an associated management task that functions in its own 
environment. It is vital that all communication channels have requisite variety to handle 
transmissions. In practice, this means that policy has to be effectively communicated to 
each operational management, which then has to have the means for translating this into 
more concrete action plans to be followed by the operation. The operation then needs 
effective channels to its environment. A breakdown at any point will lead to ineffective 
action. This principle introduces a time element. Communication along the channels has 
to be fast enough to keep up with the rate at which variety is generated; otherwise, the 
system will become unstable. The stability o f the system is dynamic, not static. Each 
entity in a self-organizing system has its own ‘language’ whenever a message crosses a 
boundary. Therefore, it needs to be ‘translated’ to continue to make sense. This process is
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transduction. If the transducer does not have requisite variety, the message is garbled or 
lost. Organization explicitly refers to the need for communication and response fast 
enough to keep up with the rate o f changes affecting the organization.
To summarize, complex systems, as defined by Beer (1979), have many 
distinguishable components (variety, heterogeneity), which interact (connectivity) and are 
intricately dependent of each other. The number o f system components is too large to 
treat them individually, but too few to treat them statistically. Their interaction is too 
complicated to divide the system without losing information and the components are too 
few for statistical treatment. In addition, any complex adaptive system has a medium 
number of intelligent and adaptive agents who act on local rather than global information. 
The macro system and its associated complexity is, to a degree, subjective in that it 
depends on the ignorance of the person examining it, and complexity is dependent on the 
framework in which it is considered. Thus, the task faced by the system designer is 
greater than the complexity faced by the operators.
Although the AOC is a military operational C2 node response to and provider of 
input into the open system of reality, Ashby (1948,1956) and Beer’s (1985) concepts 
provide understanding into why the AOC can be perceived as a regulator where the 
capability of the human organization (and not the technical infrastructure) should be 
maximized. Replicating an actual theater technical milieu, if  theoretically possible, would 
be cost prohibitive. As all combat AOCs' infrastructures technically transformed over 
time, it is important to understand how any new box ‘fits’ within its various data chains. 
By incorporating a measure (Ashby, 1948; Beer, 1985; Conant, 1976) for information 
process, one may achieve the goal of repeatability. More importantly, a quantitative
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measure of information processing provides a hope of minimizing the human variable by 
putting the human in the background.
2.7 (PLURALISM) MENTAL MODEL AND LATTICE THEORY
What is known of the world outside the AOC is not what is depicted in displays 
on the wall in front of the operators, but the shared mental model in the minds o f the 
operators. This mental model is formed from basic beliefs and what operators, as a group, 
perceive about reality. According to Mathieu et al. (2000), “mental models...help people 
to describe, explain, and predict events in their environment” (p.274). Ever since 
behavioral psychologist E.C. Tolman (1948) promulgated the phrase "cognitive map", 
this concept has been studied and adapted in disciplines such as cognitive psychology, 
behavioral geography, computer science, engineering, and neuropsychology. The term 
'mental map' or model commonly represents the internal knowledge base o f living data 
processors. Organization theory describes team mental models in terms o f shared and/or 
tacit knowledge (Carley, 1997; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). Team members in any 
organization are more effective when they have the information needed to accomplish 
their tasks effectively. Individuals who self-identify as members o f a team understand 
that they will only succeed if they are aware of the role and function they perform. While 
team members do share some forms of mental models and some harmonizing of 
situational awareness, they are individuals, and it is unlikely they are carbon copies of 
each other. Further, each team member has different tacit knowledge, domain expertise, 
and task responsibilities, and therefore cannot share the same mental model and do not 
need identical situational awareness. This interwoven situational awareness concept was 
developed and refined by Sonnenwald and Pierce (1998), who suggest C2 teams perform
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better when members develop an interwoven pattern of awareness of the milieu in which 
they operate, mixed with an awareness o f what other team members see or ought to see.
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Figure 15. Modification of Sonnenwald and Pierce (1998). Interwoven Situational
Awareness
Sonnenwald (1998) developed this concept further. She suggested that interwoven 
situational awareness may be composed o f three distinct, but mutually reinforcing, types 
o f ‘awareness.’ Environmental awareness involves recognition of the current state of 
activity inside the task environment. The task environment in this level of awareness is 
different for different tasks. For individuals with a narrow and specific task to perform, 
environmental awareness would be restricted to that particular task. For individuals with 
broader tasks that require them to interact outside a particular setting, environmental
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awareness includes both the physical environment and the combat environment in which 
the AOC is controlling forces. Domain or content awareness involves the individual team 
member recognizing something of importance to a particular task or conceptual area of 
responsibility. Interpersonal awareness involves an individual’s sensitivity to what 
teammates think or feel, how emotions may affect performance on team tasks or 
processes, or preferred work and communications styles. Raw data or raw information 
flowing into the AOC have to be interpreted and understood by at least one person and 
communicated to add to overall group knowledge. Team collaborative work requires 
communication be completed between at least two individuals. The United States Army 
has looked at the communication process within teams on at least one occasion. A 1980 
research effort studied verbal transmission of information between different echelons in a 
command group and found the percentage of information successfully transmitted and 
received seemed related to personality and position. The study focused on impact of 
individual communications style on team performance, but did not fully explore team 
information behavior itself (Kaplan, 1980).
In the conceptual work concerning the relationship between mental models, team 
performance, and situational awareness, researchers began to realize that, although 
possession of accurate mental models is a prerequisite for effective team performance and 
team situational awareness, it may not be sufficient. Specifically, researchers have argued 
that while members must hold accurate mental models, it is the sharing o f mutual mental 
models among members -  or shared mental models -  that allows for effective 
coordinated and adaptive team behavior. Graham (2004) shows that this sharing is 
particularly critical if military units are to be adaptive. This sharing may be especially
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difficult in multinational teams because cultural differences place obstacles to 
information exchange that is required to develop these models. For example, a person 
from a culture with strong power distance beliefs may not feel comfortable presenting a 
skill set to a supervisor. Others (Craik, K. (1943), Ehrlich, K. (1996). Gentner, D., and A. 
L. Stevens, Eds. (1983). Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983) Moray, 1990) have suggested using 
lattice theory to provide formalism for the knowledge base used as a mental model by 
operators. The ordering relation is interpreted as 'is caused by', so the lattice becomes a 
representation of the operator's causal hypotheses about the system. One can think o f a 
given system causally in different ways (purposes, mechanics, physical form, etc.). Each 
alternative gives rise to a separate lattice. These lattices relate to each other and to an 
objective description of the structure and function of the physical system by 
homomorphic mappings, which is an extension of Aristotle’s levels of abstraction. Errors 
arise when nodes on the mental lattices are not connected in the same way as the physical 
system lattice: when the latter changes so that the mental lattice no longer provides an 
accurate map, even as a homomorphism, or when inverse one-to-many mapping gives 
rise to ambiguities.
There have been few studies on how organizational knowledge compares to 
reality. Lattice theory provides a method to understand the group interaction. An 
objective lattice description of the real physical relations between the parts o f the system 
as in engineering specifications expresses the interactions among physical components in 
reality. This lattice I will call the physical system lattice (PSL). Insofar as an operator's 
mental model is isomorphic to the PSL, just to that extent is it a complete model of the 
physical system, and just to that extent will the mental model's predictions exactly match
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the output of the different parts of the physical system when it is provided with system 
inputs and parameter values. In general, however, the operator's knowledge will be 
imperfect for at least two reasons. First, if the system is large, it may simply be 
impossible for the operator to scan and remember the displayed values of the system 
variables to acquire a perfect knowledge of the system relations. Second, and more 
importantly, the abstraction hierarchy suggests that, for many purposes, mental models 
will be homomorphs, not isomorphs, of the physical system.
The higher the level of the abstraction hierarchy at which a person thinks about 
the system, the fewer the elements to think about. A Group may contain several 
Squadrons. A Squadron will contain several Aircraft. An Aircraft may contain several 
bombs. Thus, it is advantageous for an operator to consider a system as high up the 
hierarchy as possible to reduce his or her mental workload and the amount of data he or 
she must carry in his or her working memory. The higher levels of the abstraction 
hierarchy are formed from the lower levels by many-to-one mappings that develop in 
formal training or informal experience. That is, higher levels o f abstraction are 
homomorphs o f lower levels. They preserve the causal relations between subsystems with 
a loss o f detail. Suppose that different kinds o f causes may give rise to different lattices. 
Each cause (formal, material, efficient, or final [that is, purpose]) can provide a complete 
description of the system in its own terms. These descriptions are complementary, not 
mutually exclusive. Each can be derived as a formal cause lattice [FCL], material cause 
lattice [MCL], efficient cause lattice [ECL] or purposive cause lattice [PCL] by an 
appropriate mapping from the PSL, and each has its own abstraction hierarchy. In 
practice, each will be defective in a different way. For example, one may know a
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particular circuit is present to provide cooling (final cause) and know what values of the 
display show that it is working and what controls switch it on or off (formal cause), but 
not know what mechanism is involved, or its underlying physical principles (material and 
efficient cause). In such a case, FCLs and PCLs will contain elements not present in 
MCLs and ECLs. These mental mappings and their effect on flow as described by 
Shannon (1948), Conant (1976), Ashby (1948), and Beer (1985) are poorly reconciled. 
These seminal authors use terms like “blockage,” and other qualitative terms to deal with 
“abstraction”. Mental model and lattice theory provides understanding as to why the 
technical picture displayed on the wall is not what an organization actually understands.
It also defines why any human organization should not be assumed to be populated by 
automatons and that it will always change and morph, minute to minute and shift to shift. 
Mental model and lattice theory bring out the point that Ashby, Beer, and Conant's 
models strip away a majority of the complexity in humans.
2.7.1 Data Flow Model
One of the difficulties swiftly encountered in researching C2 is high variability in 
the quality o f literature about the subject, as the writings may express an author’s 
cogitative concepts about a wide range of subjects. Many writings are articulated with 
thoughts that are an ‘inch deep and a mile wide’ in quantitative or qualitative facts, which 
leads to near impossibility of repeatability as validation. Much of Western literature 
about military C2 is inductive in nature and uses only the principle o f coherence, 
implying ‘truth’ based on metal ornaments, hard won, on the author’s garments. Like any 
military command node, the AOC can be represented as a task model because positional 
functions are well understood and allow creation of operation sequence diagrams for 
deeper analysis. An additional function to understand in the role o f the AOC is the
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underlying technical network. Understanding of the technical infrastructure requires 
examination from an information theory (origination, information flows, IT use, and 
information-worker productivity) perspective. Studies of IT-productivity demonstrate 
new technologies as well as adaptation to a different way o f working that allow increased 
absorption o f available information with a significant effect on individual and overall unit 
production (Aral & Weill, 2007; Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, & Konsynski, 1999; 
Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2000) by increasing asynchronous communication (Hinds &
Kiesler, 2002). Information can reduce uncertainty (Cyert & March, 1963) or temper risk 
aversion behavior (Arrow, 1962; Stiglitz, 2000). When information is vague, it takes time 
to verify it by collection o f additional data, thus reducing effective decisions (Hansen, 
2002). All these factors point to a measurable chain, in which the initial data can be 
collected and analyzed. Information theory treats each human as an information channel, 
thus minimizing the factor of human variability. Applying this theory allows one to 
understand the infrastructure that moves data quantitatively. Is the electric representation 
of data on an accessible network? Is the format correct, can it be found, and, if  found, 
retrieved? If retrieved, can it be understood? Do the additional data improve the 
effectiveness of the knowledge worker, or can he even use it? How does an information 
worker’s understanding compare to that of the decision maker? A goal of this dissertation 
is to accomplish information flow analysis using quantitative data captured from a 
representative C2 node.
2.7.2 (Pluralism) Social Network
To understand the AOC, it is critical to examine the underlying supporting 
structure. Social Network Analysis (SNA) is an appropriate tool to evaluate the human 
networking side of C2. Social network theory looks at relationships in terms of links and
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nodes. Nodes are the individuals and links are a relationship between the individuals. 
There are many different ways people can be linked (face-to-face, e-mail, text chat, 
phone, meetings, etc.) and each interaction has an effect on the whole. The core 
assumption is that the relationship is the most important function. Social networking 
proposes individuals are less important than their relationships. Those relationships 
define a structure that can be studied, mapped, monitored, measured, and evaluated 
graphically or statistically to improve organizational outputs (Barnes, 1954; Granovetter, 
1973; Milgram, 1967). A SNA study can prompt such questions as: “How does the actual 
organization compare to the organizational chart on the wall?”; “What paths are 
available for the information to flow?”; “Why does some information fall on the floor?”; 
“Is critical information not available?”; “How does the organizational structure change 
over time?”; or “Are increasing available paths resulting in C2 nodes taking on fewer 
closed-system characteristics?” SNA can provide both a visual and quantitative structure 
for analysis o f complex human systems like the AOC, because it can be organized in 
mathematical terms and is grounded in the repeatable analysis o f empirical data. These 
techniques have and can be used to understand diffusion of information, organizational 
behavior, the spread of disease, and other phenomena.
“Social Networks” is a term coined by John Barnes in 1954. Social Network 
Analysis seeks to understand the human interactions by looking at the people and their 
relationships within a specified social context. In Social Network Analysis, the primary 
data collected are on the relationship between actors (sometimes called points, nodes, or 
agents) with actor interactions collected as secondary data (often described as a link, 
edge, or tie) (Wasserman, 1994). The following overview is adapted from Hanneman and
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Riddle (2005). Humans are depicted in the network diagram as a simple node, or point in 
space. A line connecting the two points represents an edge, the relational connection of 
the two people. Ties can be directional; if a person claims a relationship with the other 
person, an arrow connects the nodes pointing towards the flow of information. If both 
claim a relationship, then the information flow is bi-directional and direction can be 
annotated on each end o f the edge (Figure 11):
• ------------------*•
A B
• * ------------------------------------- * •
A B
Figure 16. Examples of directional and bi-directional ties
The analysis involves an in-depth evaluation and comparison of edges at various levels: 
between two actors (also called a dyad), or among and between groups or clusters of 
actors (also called cliques), and among all nodes included in the selected network (Figure 
12). The configuration of the network can influence the outcomes and characteristics of 
individual actors because their position in the network provides both opportunities and 
constraints based on their relationship and interactions. Changes in the pattern of 
relationships change the structure of the network and in turn can change the outcomes.
4
Figure 17. An example o f a network diagram (Modification o f Hanneman & Riddle)
The data collected may also be used and displayed in a matrix algebra format since the 
information is sometimes more understandable than it would be in a graphical form. 
Figure 13 is the mathematical representation of Figure 12. Traditional statistical measures 
o f social networks are often constructed in an algebraic format for quantitative purposes.
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1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0  1 0  0 1 0
2 1 0  1 1 1 0
3 0 1 0  1 1 1
4 1 1 0  0 1 0
5 1 1 1 1 0  0
6 0 0 1 0 0 0
7 0 1 0  1 1 0
8 1 1 0  1 1 0
9 0 1 0 0 1 0
10 1 1 1 0 1 0
8 9 10
0 1 0
1 1 0  
0 0 1
0 0 0






Figure 18. An example o f a network matrix (Modification o f Hanneman & Riddle, 2005)
Ties, edges, and links can also have values. Binary data (such as yes/no questions) are 
represented by the presence or absence o f a tie. Valued data (such as “on a scale of 1 to 
7”) give information on the strength of an edge. A social network perspective is, 
inherently a multi-actor perspective. Social Network Analysis can offset the limitations of 
static organizational block diagrams (Serrat, 2009). In most cases, the trend will be to 
have narrow numbers of strong ties and large numbers of weak ties. This is most likely 
true because humans have limited amounts of time and energy, and strong relational ties 
require continued nurturing. Social structures can also develop a stable framework with 
only a limited number o f strong connections.
Social Networking defines the ability to create different organizational structures 
that can be compared and contrasted. If the Social Network structure is static, it then 
defines the courses and paths that are available for information flow.
2.7.3 Measures
To understand networks well, the community uses a common set of 
measurements. Key terms include:
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• Distance - in a network dij between two nodes (dyads), labeled i and j 
respectively, is defined as the number of edges along the shortest path connecting 
them.
• Diameter - the diameter (often described with the term “D”) of a network is the 
maximal distance among all distances between any dyads in the network.
• Average path length - the average path length “L” of the network is the mean 
distance between two dyads, averaged over all pairs of nodes.
• Characteristic Path Length (CPL) - the median of the average distance from each 
node to every other node in the network, CPL is useful in determining the diffusion 
rate of the network; the shorter the CPL, the quicker the information transfers 
throughout the network. In a social network, for instance, L is the average number of 
people existing in the shortest chain connecting two friends. I should note the average 
path lengths of most real complex networks are relatively small.
• Density -  this is the proportion of observed relationships among all possible ties, 
edges, or the interconnectedness of a network. A higher density score reflects more 
ties, which one may interpret as a more coordinated network with more opportunities 
for sharing o f information and resources among network partners.
• Clustering Coefficient - helps describe the clustering o f the network. The 
clustering coefficient, C, is the average fraction of pairs of neighbors o f a node that 
are also neighbors of each other. Suppose that a node, i, in the network K i has edges 
and they connect this node to other K i nodes. These nodes are all neighbors of node i. 
At most K j (K i  -l)/2 edges can exist among them, and this only occurs when every 
neighbor o f node i is connected to every other neighbor o f node i. The clustering
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coefficient C j of node i is then defined as the ratio between the number o f edges Ei 
that actually exist among these nodes K i and the total possible number K i (K i  -l)/2, 
namely, C ,  =  2 E i  / K i (K i  -1). The clustering coefficient C  of the whole network is the 
average of C i over all i. If and only if the network is globally coupled, which means 
that every node in the network connects to every other node, then C i = 1. Most large- 
scale real networks have a tendency toward clustering, in the sense that their 
clustering coefficients are much greater than 0, although they are still significantly 
less than one (namely, far away from being globally connected).
• Reciprocity -  while density simply measures whether or not a relational tie exists, 
reciprocity measures the direction and strength o f that tie. For example, A nominates 
B  as a partner with whom they have a strong relationship, and B  may also nominate A 
as a partner with a strong relationship, indicating reciprocity. Conversely, B  may not 
have the same view of the relationship and gives a lower rating or does not 
acknowledge a relationship with A. If they rate each other similarly, then they will 
have a high reciprocity score. Scores for this measure are proportions that range 
between 0 and 1, which are expressed as percentages in this report.
•  Indegree Centrality -  actors who have more ties have more opportunities because 
they have more access to network resources. Indegree centrality is the number of ties 
an actor has ‘in-coming’ from other actors. These incoming ties indicate network 
partners who are seeking a connection with the actor and therefore represent an 
actor’s importance in a particular area.
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• Neutrality rating -  a measurement of the amount of additional latent structure in a 
complex network. This additional latent structure, where properly configured, is the 
source of networked effects, adaptability, and modularity in complex networks.
• Nucleus -  a region of a social network with the highest concentration of links 
between nodes.
• Fringe -  a region of a social network with a low concentration of links between 
nodes.
• Betweenness Centrality -  betweenness is a common measure for diffusion of 
information in a network and denotes an actor’s value in communication. An actor 
with a high score lies between other actors and provides the shortest path between 
those other actors. If an actor with a high betweenness centrality were removed from 
the network, it would hinder communication between the remaining actors.
2.7.4 Asymmetric and Symmetric Data Flow
Human-to-human interaction will always be able to be categorized as asymmetric 
or symmetric in time required to accomplish the interaction. Symmetric communication 
may be as simple as some yelled words from the person sitting at the computer next to 
another or as asymmetric as a senior leaders reading about Troy. Symmetric 
communication could include media like voice, radio, text chat and web services, which 
result in minimal time (in human terms) between sending and receiving. Asymmetric 
communication includes anything with a human desirable time difference: books, 
magazines, e-mail, and web-pages. For pithiness, I will examine text chat as a nominal 
example o f symmetric communications.
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The biggest difference in walking into an AOC 20 years ago and today is the 
noticeable lack o f ringing telephones as an indicator of current intensity of the operation. 
Text chat has become a primary tool of ongoing military operations. Despite the 
hindrance o f current military command, control, and communications (C3), to a hear to a 
classic Napoleonic hierarchy, information revolution values strategically enable 
principles like Net-Centric Warfare, and challenge the status quo. Interaction by text chat 
across various networks is fast becoming a standard form of communication (Teredesai, 
et al., 2004). Industrial and governmental organizations are very interested in 
understanding the nature of broad knowledge-sharing networks that exist within their 
organizations. In recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Text Chat application of 
choice in the battle arena and many Department o f Defense (DOD)/Intelligence 
Community facilities is Mardam Internet Relay Chat (mIRC). mIRC is a Windows 
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) client application written by Khaled Mardam-Bey. Although it 
has not been approved for use within the DOD, Air Force and Air Operations Center 
(AOC) organizations worldwide want to use it as a collaborative tool. Few understand 
how mIRC succeeds as an information revolution’ text chat tool viable for military use.
It creates a powerful collaborative virtual environment in very low bandwidth that allows 
operators on robust communications to commune with fielded warfighters on 
disadvantaged communications. mIRC chat servers in Bahrain create a cyber community 
o f over 2700 ongoing conversations in one Regional Combatant Commander’s area of 
responsibility. Reportedly, over 1253 joint organizations exchange textual information 
via the Bahrain mIRC servers. Operators share a physical connection to a common 
network (SIPRNET) on which these servers are located. Two information revolution
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principles demonstrated for the first time in recent conflicts are military action offices 
(AOs) ‘swarming’ in cyberspace to quickly solve emerging problems, and the ‘flat earth' 
model of decision making, in which AOs are empowered to make or coordinate decisions 
rather than forcing information up the classic Napoleonic hierarchy for processing. 
Despite lack of formal approval, mIRC has been used in the field and gained notable 
acceptance. Continued use does present a number of risks and raises concerns. One 
significant issue is that mIRC is shareware, not freeware. The software is so essential that 
lack of formal approval from DOD or the developer and questions of security are 
considered a negligible risk. Justification for continued use is difficult, as free evaluated 
IRC chat clients and evaluated commercial chat software have been used successfully in 
wartime operations. Text chat capabilities can significantly enable military members to 
perform most office-oriented and operational communication tasks from their desktops. 
Collaboration capability is tied to a central military goal o f empowering end users by 
channeling the information flood into a reservoir for enterprise-wide decisions. Chat has 
had a huge impact on the tactical war fighter. Everything from mission planning to 
execution often is taking place today without a single radio transmission; debriefs from 
Operation Iraqi Freedom confirm this. The technology that permits this to take place is 
growing, but the policies that support the use of this capability have not kept pace. It is 
not unusual to find the official policy in a battle group or joint task force for use o f chat 
to include comments such as, ‘Chat will be used for administrative decisions only; all 
orders for execution will be confirmed via voice circuits.’ The policy rarely is followed. 
The problem is not with the use of chat, but with the fact that operators are working in a 
gray area of how to best use the newest technology.
I will examine web page use (posting and pulling) as a nominal example of 
asymmetric communications. CW2 Jason Cord, in his article, Fury Ring Addresses 
Knowledge Management and Dynamic Information Flow Process states, “a user will 
most likely check their e-mail multiple times a day, but only visit the portal [web page] a 
couple times a day” (p. 35). One should remember web pages are only one component of 
the entire C2 structure. There are a large number of other computer-based asymmetric 
technologies available including e-mail, recorded information, Wikis, and web logs, 
which represent communication disjointed in time. At present, military communications 
systems have limited capabilities, and most of the time operate in fixed configurations. It 
is appropriate to represent the current limited capability, fixed configuration as a web 
page where all agents can ’read’(pull) information, but only members belonging to an 
organization with a web page can ‘upload’ (post) acquired or developed information.
AOC quantitative data can be captured and analyzed supporting SNA. When a 
collection of cabled computers couples people by text chat, e-mail, or other application, 
there is a social network. SNA describes that human pattern and sees how those 
relationships affect the output and outcome. The networking approach encourages 
understanding beyond any single pair o f interactions. SNA is well understood and used 
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Figure 19. SNA Growth
SNA should be as ubiquitous as a bottle of ketchup at the nearest greasy spoon in 
analyzing C2 systems. The AOC is qualitatively efficient and accurate in planning and 
execution. The quantitative approach of SNA may have potential to improve efficiency, 
accuracy, and specificity in operational planning and tactical delivery o f air power. 
Historically, the nature o f organized conflict changes as the milieu of participants change. 
The wars of an agrarian society in the time of Charlemagne differ from the industrial 
conflicts of the 20th century. Human nature has not changed. As society moves from 
land-centric, to machine-focused, to knowledge-salient, victors and losers persist. A
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plumber derives the facts in his universe from his hands, eyes, tools, and knowledge. 
Supervision three or more levels above the person with their hands on the problem does 
not deal with reality, but with extracted perception of it. Social networks transmit this 
perception. This is the cosmology of C2. One must examine tactical assumptions about 
the current organizational structure from multiple perspectives, and SNA can be one of 
those views.
In effect, the primary task of transformation is to increase the level of 
performance o f a complex system. This ‘transformation’ is certainly a function of 
resources. However, it is also dependent on the method(s) that guide thinking, decisions, 
actions, and interpretations to support transformation within allocated resources. 
Therefore, approaches that are more sophisticated might alleviate the difficulties 
associated with transformation and more effectively allocate scarce resources (Keating, 
2003).
2.8 CONCLUSION FROM THE LITERATURE REVIEW
The entire assumption of the military science of C2 is based on the belief that we 
can deliberately organize to solve problems more efficiently. This review resolves that it 
is appropriate to conduct an analysis of a representative Air Power Operational C2 node 
using a case study designed to elicit fundamental understanding, thereby using a method 
to determine how a representative AOC C2 system changes varying noise and system 
fragmentation (C2 fundamental understanding) when operating in either a Nominal or 
Edge organizational construct.
The literature review, not being historical in nature, opens itself up to scrutiny 
because the authors and ‘facts’ have been cherry-picked. I have tried to take broad slices
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of fields to build a lens to observe operational C2. Polanyi (1983) articulates CST in this 
way:
I am looking at Gestalt as the outcome of an active shaping of experience 
preformed in the pursuit of knowledge. This shaping and integrating I held to be 
the great and indispensable tacit power by which all knowledge is discovered and, 
once discovered, is held to be true, (p.36)
From this literature review, it is relatively easy to see the seminal authors in both 
IT and Social Networking form two schools of thought. The IT school o f thought deals 
more with machine themes and would be made up of authors like Shannon (1949),
Ashby (1948), Beer (1985), Conant (1976), Sommerhoff (1950), Brillouin (1962), 
Norretranders (1991), and Waelchli (1989). Some of the authors only deal with 
mechanical themes, but they all try to solve fundamental human problems. The other 
school of thought is led by authors that are concerned with human/organizational themes. 
This school consists of authors like Mathieu (2000), Carley (1997); Klimoski & 
Mohammed (1994), Sonnenwald and Pierce (1998), Kaplan (1980), Graham (2004), 
Barnes (1954), Hanneman (2005), Granovetter (1973), and Milgram (1967). Using CST.
I have identified that between these giant schools o f thought there is a much smaller 
school of authors that write about themes that bind both the machine and the human 
themes, attacking both problem sets together. These authors consist o f thinkers like 
Bharadwaj and Konsynski (1999), Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), Aral and Weill (2007), 
Hinds and Kiesler (2002), Cyert and March (1963), Arrow (1962), Stiglitz (2000). and 
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Figure 20. Relationship o f Schools of Thought
By using CST as major inquiry method, I am able to identify major themes in the 
literature (i.e. machine themes, human/organizational themes, and authors that 
synchronize the knowledge learned from both). In addition, I am able to critique the 
literature on how the thoughts o f the writers relate, and I have been able to identify gaps 
in the knowledge base (i.e. not a well-developed body of literature that point in the 
waypoints, fundamental C2 discoveries, nor expected future developmental philosophy 
for C2 systems).
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CHAPTER THREE - RESEARCH DESIGN
This chapter will describe the methods and procedures applied for creating a C2 
model and analyzing the data for this case study. This chapter will include a discourse of 
the research Case Study technique; an examination of the data collection method; an 
exegesis o f the data analyses; trustworthiness and validity of the method; an appraisal of 
the study's significance; and, finally, a chapter summary.
The purpose o f this case study is to examine and compare two organizational C2 
structures when subjected to increasing noise and system fragmentation.
3.1 RESEARCH TECHNIQUE
According to Eisenhardt (1989), case study research can be defined as “a research 
strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings” (p. 
534). The AOC defines a single setting. Therefore, the use of the case study method is 
appropiate to use in researching fundamental airpower C2 issues. Yin (2003) notes case 
study methods may be involved in three roles: exploratory/descriptive studies, evaluation 
studies, and/or hypothesis testing. Exploratory and descriptive case studies (this 
dissertation is nominally binned into this category) examine the characteristics of some 
sort of extraction of reality with the hope o f developing elicitation o f input/output or 
cause-to-effect affiliations. The evaluation case study methodology proposes identifying 
potential explanations for a documented result that has already happened. The result 
could be either positive or negative; in either case, the goal is to understand what caused 
it.
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3.1.2 History of Case Studies
The use o f the case study method has a history of on-again, off-again use. It is 
generally believed the case study research method originated in France in the early 19th 
century as a method to accomplish social science research. Early American use of the 
method is most closely associated with the Sociology Department at the University of 
Chicago, where Robert Park, an ex-newspaper reporter and editor, led the charge and 
used it extensively. Around 1935, there was a desire for the study o f Sociology to move 
toward a more scientific approach using associated quantitative methods, leading to a 
period of less use of the case study as a research method, and an increase in use of the 
survey method. Influential researchers in using the method include Campbell (1975), 
Lincoln and Guba (1985), Platt (1992), Smith and Pohland (1974), Stake, Easely, and 
Anastasiou (1978), Stake (1995), and Yin (1992).
Even in the early use of the case study method in Sociology, there was 
controversy and detractors. The members o f the Sociological Positivists’ school of 
thought wanted stable laws defining social interactions and considered the case study 
method as un-scientific. The members tended to consider proof only when quantitative 
methods could produce statically valid generalizable laws. Disputable issues then and 
today continue to center around reliability, validity, sampling, data collection, analysis, 
and generalization of the results. There is no consensus on what a case is or what a case 
study is not because the practice exists across a broad expanse of disciplines. Yin (1994) 
may provide the most commonly accepted definition when he writes:
A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
the phenomena and context are not clearly evident. [It] copes with the technically
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distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than 
data points and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data 
needing to converge in a triangulating fashion another result benefits from the 
prior development of theoretical proposition to guide data collection and analysis, 
(p. 13)
Case study research creditability often centers on the similar terms of reliability, and 
validity. Validity and reliability often have overlapping meanings. According to Martyn 
Hammersley (1990), validity refers to how accurately an account can represent a social 
phenomenon, and reliability is a matter o f degree o f consistency of observed objects 
(1992). To counteract integrity problems with this creditability issue, researchers (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994; Reige & Nair, 1996; Yin, 1989) have developed five approaches: 
construct validity; conformability; internal validity/credibility; external 
validity/transferability; and finally, reliability/dependability.
a) Construct validity ensures adequate operational measures for the concepts
under investigation (Emory & Cooper, 1991; McDaniel & Gates, 1991).
b) Conformability is the ability o f others to satisfy themselves that the research
was carried out as described by the researcher (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; 
Miles & Huberman, 1994; Riege & Nair, 1996).
c) Internal validity/credibility is defined as the causal relationships between
variables that may influence other variables (Emory & Cooper. 1991; 
McDaniel & Gates, 1991; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Zikmund, 1991).
d) External validity/transferability is the scope to which the findings can be
replicated, or, in other words, generalizability (Emory & Cooper, 1991;
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Lincoln & Guba, 1985; McDaniel & Gates, 1991; Miles & Huberman, 
1994; Yin, 1989).
e) Reliability/dependability is the ability o f other researchers to carry out the same 
study, with similar results (Cassell & Symon, 1994; Emory & Cooper, 
1991; King et al., 1994; McDaniel & Gates, 1991; Miles & Huberman, 
1994; Singleton et al., 1993).
Sampling is not random when using a qualitative approach such as a case study. 
Often truly random sampling cannot be used in case study research due to the inability to 
differentiate the special from the general among random chosen objects.
To study the C2 air power effectively, I needed a research design that allowed for 
a high degree of perturbations within a research range, as the important variables are not 
all known at the start of the investigation. According to Yin (2003), case studies are an 
appropriate method for this type o f research. The purpose of Section 3.1 was to review 
the value of the case study method as a useful technique for the understanding o f an 
operational airpower C2 node. I attempted to achieve three goals: first, define the 
exploratory case study; second, provide examples of model based exploratory case 
studies accomplished by others; and finally, defining the shortcomings and examining the 
limitations of the technique (note that this section will not examine the techniques for the 
design and reporting of case study research). The design and reporting results are well 
defined in case study literature (Feagin, Orum, & Sjoberg, 1991; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003). 
Instead, the focus o f this section is to show how a ‘good’ model-based case study can be 
an appropriate substitute for the analysis near impossible to obtain by primary data or the 
analysis of secondary data.
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There are three basic methods to accomplish case study research:
1) Survey -  as defined by Robson (2002) as a “collection o f standardized
information from a specific population, or some sample from one, usually, 
but not necessarily by means of a questionnaire or interview” (p.228);
2) Experimentation -  the choice of this dissertation research as defined by Robson
(2002) as “measuring the effect o f manipulating one variable on another 
variable” (p. 110) (in this case, the variables are the technical infrastucture 
network and human command network);
3) Action research —  where the observer is involved in the change process. To
be consistent, Robson (2002) defines the purpose of action research as 
“influencing] or changing] some aspect of whatever is the focus o f the 
research” (p. 215).
Exploratory case study method is designed to find the answers to questions posed by the 
study. The questions for this dissertation are well defined and within range of the 
proposed research. An additional reason investigative case study is an appropriate 
method for Air Power C2 has been expounded by Abramson (1992) due to the 
uniqueness of the data:
since such data are rare, they can help elucidate the upper and lower boundaries of 
experience. Second such data can facilitate...prediction by documenting 
infrequent non-obvious, or counter intuitive occurrences that may be missed by 
standard statistical (or empitical) approaches, (p. 190)
Exploratory case study research is not a random sampling o f a system being examined, as 
asserted by major researchers in the field, including Yin (2003) and Stake (1995).
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Selected cases must be designed to maximize knowledge acquisition during the time 
period and within the resource constraints of the particular study.
As mentioned, exploratory case studies have been used by others, such as in the 
1997 RAND Weapons Mixed and Exploratory Analysis by Arthur Brooks, Steve Bankes 
and Bart Bennett. In the RAND introduction, they define an exploratory analysis as a 
method to help comprehend complex systems such as combat models which may have 
imperfectly known parameters, decisions, and measures o f effectiness. In a model-based 
exploratory case study, the model is run at many different input levels. In this case, the 
noise and system fragmentation are increased stepwise. Just as in the RAND study, in 
this exploratory model, a relatively large set o f scenarios and conditions are set and their 
outcomes are observed. Various communities are undertaking case study using 
modeling. When conditions in any community preclude building the target system, 
modelers must make assumptions about their systems’ details and interworkings. The 
resulting model is not a one-for-one representation of the real world, but it can provide 
insight as to how the world would behave if the modelers’ assumptions are correct. 
Computational experimentation case studies are commonplace (Anderson, 1988; 
Campbell et al., 1985; Lipton, Marr & Welsh, 1989; Rose & Dobson, 1985; Strauss, 
1974).
Case studies have well-recognized disadvantages. Even seminal authors such as 
Yin (1984) state that, “too many times, the case study investigator has been sloppy, and 
has allowed equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the direction o f the findings 
and conclusions” (p. 14), decrying case study research that lacks academic rigor. In 
addition, scientific generalization resulting from case study research, in particular
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research using a single case study method, is very problematic. As Yin (2003) writes, 
“How can you generalise from a single case?” (p. 10)
In addition, Tellis (1997) criticizes the single-case exploration method for its 
difficulty in producing generalized conclusions. However, Yin (1993) notes that defining 
the parameters and setting the objectives in the research are more important than a large 
sample size. In my attempt to meet Yin’s research standard, I used a single model to set 
the design parameters, and utilized a sample size larger than a single run (case). The 
third general criticism of case study research method is that the reports are too long, with 
mountains of data that are not well-managed or organized systematically for readers’ 
understanding (Yin, 1984). This criticism often points at case studies that are 
ethnographic or longitudinal in nature. Air Power C2 case study will be a comparison 
case study and longitudinal issues are not expected be encountered.
Many researchers have also criticized case studies for failure to adequately 
account for measurement o f dependent and independent variables, lack o f defining a 
control, and arbitrariness in defining the results o f the work (Campbell and Stanley, 1966; 
Carlsmith et. al., 1976; Kazdin, 1978; Kratochwill, 1978). Command and Control in the 
Information Age will mitigate these criticisms by accomplishing sensitivity analysis of 
the ELICIT model to understand the relationship o f the variables, accomplishing well 
defined comparison of independent runs, and defining the results of the work through 
binocular lenses o f Information Theory and Social Networking theory. Yin (2003) states: 
the case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which 
there will be many more variables of interest than data points; .. .relies on 
multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating
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fashion; and ...benefits from the prior development o f theoretical propositions to
guide data collection and analysis, (p. 2)
My case study approach has been a comprehensive research strategy where I develop a 
conceptual framework, design a compressive model, collect predefined data, and analyze 
the data through my developed framework.
3.2 CONCEPTUAL MODEL
A conceptual lens of information flow in an AOC provides a sieve to extract from 
reality the data needed to accomplish a valid analysis. Information theory work has been 
accomplished in conjunction with nuclear power plants using Conant's model as a tool for 
describing human information processing (Kim, Soong, & Poong, 2003). Understanding 
paths and flows of information should give some indication of where there is sharing or 
blockage of information. The interaction of the human and technical networks should 
also suggest where and how knowledge leading to a decision comes about. The sharing of 
information could be the result of some path o f communication between nodes 
(individuals/organizations) or through use of common screens o f technically presented 
information. 1 will not analyze all five AOC divisions due to required resource 
expenditure.
The Man-Machine Interface (MMI) is where Beer (1986) defines the point at 
which the message crosses a boundary where it is “translated,” or undergoes transduction 
to continue to make sense. To meet tomorrow’s challenges requires knowledge, not only 
of the physical capacity o f individuals and the team, but also cognitive capabilities and 
tendencies. The consequences of ignoring the cognitive function of the MMI are evident 
in failure. The ultimate objective is to model the cognitive behavior o f the operators of
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the AOC to improve macro system design. To accomplish this analysis, it is important to 
develop a very detailed operator model in which operator incongruity can receive 
particular emphasis. An operator centric model should suggest several aspects that will be 
important in designing to maximize human team abilities in accomplishing complex 
tasks. Systems like the AOC, which involve loosely coupled IT decision support systems, 
need to be designed and maintained to maximize supporting human cognitive skill.
Scholars have debated for years about the capacity o f decision makers to make 
major changes in direction from prior decisions at both individual and group level. One 
group of researchers stubbornly assumed the “rational human” actor. Another argued 
substantial change is rare, as indicated by the conservative nature o f decision-making. In 
this view, stasis becomes the characteristic state o f organizational and individual 
decision-making. In this static view, there are strong disincentives to decisions that depart 
substantially from the status quo (Lindblom, 1959). In the real world o f military 
decision-making, disincentives render large departures from the norm rare and 
dangerous. Those who dispute this stable argument model often point to examples of 
changes resulting from ‘basin o f stability' change when the ‘logical human’ argument 
had some sway. Many government policy areas seem to have experienced large changes; 
recent examples would include the space program in the 1960s and military budgets after 
9-11. This dissertation assumes incremental decision-making is the appropriate model.
Before describing a single channel decision flow, it is necessary to describe 
potential characteristics o f operator behavior within an artificial representation of reality. 
Wood and Roth (1986) have summarized the characteristics of human operator behavior
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for nuclear power plants as the following, which they propose as a proxy for a Combat 
Operation division:
(1) Need for continuous monitoring or tracking o f how disturbances develop, rather 
than a single diagnosis.
(2) Team must revise responses, based on a changing assessment o f the situation, 
including the mental model of the expected dynamics o f reality.
(3) How one sees the situation at any point depends, in part, on how they and others 
have perceived the event up to that point.
(4) Need to anticipate what could happen and, therefore revise monitoring strategies.
(5) Situation requires incremental decision-making with repeated inspection o f the 
process and adjustment of the problem solutions.
(6) Adequate feedback is essential.
These qualities provide evidence that a contextual model is better able to describe 
overall team dynamic behavior than a sequential or workflow model. Workflow 
sequential models have difficulty describing continuous observations with revisions 
resulting from unanticipated responses with an uncertain outcome. Most workflow 
models are unidirectional sequence processes with stimulus input results in some 
response output. Conversely, contextual models can show flexibility and emphasize the 
comparison between a set sequence o f processes and a choice o f processing as a function 
o f overall context. L. Bainbridge (1997) has described the details of the differences 
between the two models. Error! Reference source not found. 21 shows a proposed 
overview o f the information processing model for warfighters in combat operations. In 
the proposed model, any operator is represented as an information-processing channel of
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Figure 21. Overview of Information Processing Model
The stages of information processing are depicted by rectangular boxes. Circles 
depict the input or output o f information o f the stage. Any input or output actually is to be 
included at the appropriate stage since the information process is carried out in the stage 
(the drawing is constructed as a simple visual conveyance device for the concept). The 
arrows represent flow of information (in this case factoids). Arrows show backflow that 
represents the movement to previous stages. Backflow arrows do not convey information.
In this case, backflow means the operators retrograde to a previous stage and information 
already acquired and processed in the current stage is temporarily stored in their working 
memory or forgotten (Conant's term would most likely be blockage). The model shows 
process sequence as well as the information flow internally processed by the operator. By 
describing how information is integrated and reduced in stages, the model provides better 
elucidation. The same model can represent asymptotic performance or something less 
than standard without defining individual failure. The model can also convey various 
flows created from constrained extraction of the theater air power open system. In the 
propose process, inputs are matched with the operator's tacit knowledge or mental model 
and transformed to another type of output. Information at this stage could undergo a 
higher level of abstraction. If the data blob is not matched or is validated as irrelevant it 
may just ‘fall on the floor’ (blocked).
98





Tacit K now ledge Base 
(M ental M odel)
Figure 22. Information Matching Model
To better understand the proposed model, certain terms need to be defined. The 
definitions in Table 4 should be used as reference.
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Table 4. Definitions of the transformed information
Information Definition
Signal
Information that exists in the environment or is provided by the 
external reality
Set of indicators and/or alarms or verbal messages from other
Sign
operators
Sensory data presented on an individual client workstation 
Certain features in the environment and the connect condition
Specific meanings about signal and significant or meaningful
Problem
information
Warning information notifying occurrence o f some unanticipated
Situation
change in environment
Perceived state o f the overall air power
Information related with a change of reality & the perturbation
Cause
that produced the anomaly
Information about the anomalies and the root causes
Goal Ultimate objective of actions carried out in response to anomalies
Procedure
Steps to follow for problem solving
Written or memorized process to be performed in order to
Schedule an Action
achieve a goal
Series of actions chosen and scheduled according to the 
procedure
Information acquisition is capturing data available at pickup points with the 
probes that are in place. An example of this process is Airborne Warning And Control 
System (AWACS) (pickup point) using airborne radar (probe) to create a COP track (data 
displayed in the AOC). The first step captures data available from the external
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environment. At this time, the warfighter must correlate raw data (AWACS generated 
track) to understand the logical and physical variables of their externally provided inputs 
that create their perception of reality. Tacit assumptions provide cognitive meaning o f the 
signals provided. The operators can create many types o f information as output. Members 
of Combat Operations can receive symmetric communication as a sign from individual 
computer screens, verbally from another team member, via the Ultra-high Frequency 
(UHF)/Very High Frequency (VHF) radio, over one o f several telephones, or chat 
screens. Members o f Combat Operations may also receive asymmetric communication 
as an e-mail, a message, or another publication. The operator can transform the signal 
information to start to describe a problem, a situation, or a cause. Figure 15 provides a 
visual depiction o f information acquisition.
Environm ent Information
A cq u is it ion
Signal Sign
Signal P ro b le m
Signal S i tu a t io n
Signal G oal
Signal P r o c e d u r e
Signal S. A ction
Figure 23. Information Acquisition
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Information monitoring is the result of information acquisition. Monitoring 
accrues when normal (anticipated) or abnormal changes in the milieu cross the level of 
perception, and should be acknowledged if important enough. This is the point at which 
cognitive activity and working memory cross and it is the traditional step after 
information acquisition. If the event is not acknowledged, it will often be assumed to be 
background noise and could easily ‘fall on the floor,’ or in Conant’s term become 
‘blocked.’ Sign information may come from C2 systems, text chat, telephones, or other 
operators. Operators may take an immediate action with a known response to a high 
priority input. Monitoring interprets the signs from the previous stage and generates 
symptoms as output. A situation produced by the signs or other operators may become 
blocked if the operator perceives the situation is a result o f incorrect, uncorrelated, or 
obsolete information. Based on the priority o f the signal, operators may decide to skip all 
intermediate steps and go directly to executing an immediate response or execute an ad 
hoc search for additional information. Error! Reference source not found, shows the 
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Redress occurs when monitoring and a perceived problem (perturbation) accrues. 
The members staffing Combat Operations try to determine location and/or cause of the 
anomalies, faults, or events that are receiving additional scrutiny. Individuals generate 
hypotheses based on synthesized information from multiple sources and senses. This 
stage continues diagnosis and starts cause analysis. Other operators start to bring to bear 

























As redress happens, synchronizing will become a necessity. Floor operators will 
predict how to move back toward an expected outcome or how to minimize some losses. 
In synchronizing (coordinating), they will set goals, and procedures will start to become 
clear. Often, both goals and procedures will require some level of command decision. 
Procedures to respond to a situation are always formulated to achieve a goal. Procedures 
absolutely depend on the goal and involve the tasks expected to reach the goal. The goal 
may come from written guidance in documents like the ATO, Rules of Engagement 
(ROE), Air Operations Directive (AOD), or another source. The procedure could be 
written in the standard operating procedure (SOP), memorized through experienced and 
training, or given as oral instruction. The main impetus is to determine if something 
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Figure 26. Coordination Process
If and when Implementation (Error! Reference source not found.27) is
accomplished, a schedule action will result as an output task accomplished using the 
MMI. The system output may be as simple as pushing the acquired information to 
another organization to resolve or scheduling some action to take later. Conversely, the 
task could be an immediate response requiring all available C2 systems and operators to 
come together to solve a task. An example of an immediate response would be executing 



































Dynamic Targeting is any targeting inside the ATO cycle. It is a process that 
identifies emerging and/or fleeting targets and determines how they are prosecuted via 
kinetic or non-kinetic means. TSTs start with guidance, categorization, relative 
prioritization, assessment criteria, collection requirements, and many other aspects of 
prosecution. Most o f the information builds or is determined in the pre-operation 
planning and/or as part o f deliberate targeting. Often a TST decision matrix is created, 
but it is not a substitute for the warfighter fully understanding the underlying TST 
guidance, ROE, collateral damage methodologies, and TST operating procedures that
106
form the TST decision matrix document. A good TST decision matrix framework should 
include TST prioritization, approval authority, restrictions, acceptable risk level, 
identification (ID) criteria, and desired effects. Operator guidance will be reviewed 
periodically to ensure it is appropriate and relevant as the nature of the threat and/or 
conflict changes. The result could be some sort of execution through the MMI as depicted 
in Figure 28.
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In the application of Conant’s Model, total information flow is represented by the 
sum of the total rate for the subsystems. For convenience of calculation, assume the input 
from the environment has a probability approximately ‘o ff  and ‘on,’ so each has 1 bit, 
though in a real situation probabilities about ‘on’ and ‘o ff  are not equal, with ‘o ff  being 
most likely. In the case o f many-to-one mappings, assume output will be generated only 
if all input is ‘on.’ In information acquisition, there is no blockage, as all input is 
transferred to the Identification stage. Information blockage accrues when information 
does not transfer to the next stage because there is a reduction in the amount of 
information caused by many-to-one mappings. The goal is to fill in a chart similar to 
Table 5.
Table 5. Information Flow







The information Flow ‘F’ is the amount of information processed by the 
individual operator or by the team as measured by Conant’s method. It is also a measure 
of the uncertainty o f the situation (Shannon, 1948). The amount can be represented as the 
sum of thru-put, blockage, and coordination (Ashby, 1948; Beer, 1985). Information
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processing in any task will be mapped (or integrated) as a set o f input transforming into a 
set of output, thereby reducing uncertainty. The amount of process information directly 
relates to the operator's workload. If a task demands a load beyond the operator or team's 
ability, related errors may arise. Quantitative information analysis could level capacity or 
determine if a new or improved IT system provides value to the human network. By 
defining transformation o f information in stages, I can quantify the proposed model. Each 
term (thru-put, blockage, and coordination) will be measured and considered as a 
workload that is designed to do the required tasks.
3.3 PHYSICAL MODEL MANIPULATION, DATA COLLECTION
To increase understanding of the output generated with the ELICIT model, it is 
critical to have positive control over the input. Positive control of dependent variables 
should allow understanding of independent variables operating in the ELICIT model. The 
selected case study method is a comparison. To evaluate the human network I will 
compare a nominal AOC organization structure to an AOC in an Edge organization 
construct. The dependent variable of the human network is represented by the abELICIT 
agents; the independent variables are the technical network infrastructure, which I 
manipulate.
In ELICIT, organizations are designed with the configuration file and agents, then 
process the factoids received to determine, among other things, whether to share that 
information with other agents it is connected to, or to post or pull factoids from a notional 
website dedicated to a particular aspect of the problem. For abELICIT, whether and when 
the agents have solved the problem is determined by processing the log files after the run 
is completed. Software agents may be parameterized according to 54 parameters that
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determine, among other aspects, the way they process information, build awareness,
socialize and identify, whether to share, how often to share, and the propensity to seek
information. These are all examples of agent parameters that can vary. A number of
parameters are associated with the amount of time a particular action takes, e.g., how
long it takes to share or post a factoid once the agent determines it will share or post.
Finally, there are a few Boolean (on/off, true/false) parameters, such as whether the agent
is a guesser or a hoarder of factoids.
Using this understanding of AbAgent based ELICIT, there are three primary data
input mechanisms into the ELICIT C2 model that the experimenter can control: 1) the
configuration file; the 2) factoid list; and 3) what actions are available. For this
comparison case study, actions available are held constant in both the Nominal and Edge
AOC organization
3.3.1 Configuration File
j Cogftg File* j *■
Configuration files
S e lr d  i ontigurdtiut) lile to upload  onto * r rv r r .
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Figure 29. ELICIT Configuration Screen
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Figure 29 shows how an organization type .csv file can be loaded into the ELICIT server. 
Support from an information technology specialist is not required.
The file is in .csv (comma-delimited) format, which means that the value in each 
field is separated with a comma or similar marker. In the ELICIT configuration files, the 
fields are separated with a vertical bar (|).
A key at the top of the ELICIT configuration example file explains data within:
n|Role|team|Country|l|2|3|... 17|Web site 11 Web site2| Web site3| Web site4 
beginning on line 5 with the player number, a team member identity, and a country label 
for that player (if a code of <country*> is supplied, then the nth entry in the country table 
specified for the experiment trial is used). The table is completed with a series of numeral 
1 ’s with a single 0, which is sequentially arrayed across the grid. If there is a 1 in the first 
player position, then the player associated with the row can share with the first player. If 
there is a 0 in the 5th player position, then the player associated with the row cannot share 
with the 5th player. In a traditional ELICIT construction, if there is a 1 in a Web site 
column, then the player associated with that row can access the Web site. If there is a 0 in 
a Web site column, then the player associated with that row cannot access the Web site. 
For this case study ELICIT has been modified to allow read (R), write (1), and no access 
(0) to the various Web pages. In the following example, the organization file is the 
ELICIT baseline C2-17.csv (the 17-playerconfiguration file for a C2 organization). In 
this organization type, the Cross-Team Coordinator and four Team Leaders (who 
coordinate who, what, when, and where information), have different access privileges to 









































































































































































By evolving the ELICIT software platform, tools, and procedures, I am able to 
support conducting ELICIT experiments using operations tasks. I started with the 
baseline ELICIT task (Ruddy, 2007), which is an intelligence task. Periodically during an 
experiment, ELICIT distributes factoids (i.e., information elements that are pieces of the 
scenario) to the participants. Participants can choose to disseminate or not disseminate 
factoids to others by sharing information directly with a particular participant or by 
posting a factoid to a particular information system. However, only by communicating 
information can participants achieve sufficient levels o f awareness to complete the task. 
The four original baseline factoid sets each contain 68 factoids (four for each of the 17 
participants). These factoids contain only true information. There is no incorrect or 
conflicting information. Each factoid belongs to one of four categories:
1) Key (K) - Contains information that is essential for a specific problem 
space.
2) Expertise (E) - Contains information that is essential for solving the 
problem and may be important for more than one specific aspect of the 
task space, such as special information a team leader may possess.
3) Supportive (S) - Contains information which supports key and expertise 
factoids
4) Noise (N) -  Contains information that is irrelevant to solving the task.
Each baseline Factoid Set consists o f 17 Key or Expertise, 17 Supportive and 34 Noise 
factoids. Thus, the ratio o f relevant information to noise is 50%.
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For purposes o f the original experiment design, I took care to treat each 
participant equally. The factoid scenarios are anonymized to reduce distractions based on 
previous experiences.
In this Air Power case study, I started out with 50% noise. For the second run, I 
added two more noise factoids per participant, bringing the noise percentage up to 66%. 
For the final run, there are six noise factoids, bringing the noise percentage up to 75%. 
Although I did not increase noise enough to choke the system, by choosing these three 
steps, I was able to discern any trends. The experiment design is to measure the time 
needed to arrive at shared awareness across two different organizational structures 
(Nominal, Edge) when step increasing two different information flow variables (noise, 
system fragmentation). An increasing number o f websites represents system 
fragmentation, and increasing the number of noise factoids represents noise. At one time,
I planned to accomplish system fragmentation by breaking Key and Supporting factoids 
into multiple inputs. The technique of breaking Key and Supporting factoids into multiple 
inputs failed in execution, as there was no way to determine if resulting system 
perturbations merely reflected a change in syntaxes and not system fragmentation.
3.4 DATA CAPTURE
The variables expected to be measured by data extracted from the ELICIT 























Average number of interactions (i.e., 
total shares, posts and pulls) per subject. 
Network reach measures the percentage 
of subjects that a specific subject 
interacted with.
The average network reach is the average 
value
across all organizations and is measured 
here as a 
percentage.
Average number o f interactions (i.e., 
total shares, posts and pulls) per subject.
Relevant conclusion reached:
- average amount and percentage across 
both 
organizations 
- amount per key role (JFC, JFACC, 
CCO)
Amount o f relevant factoids accessible 
by all subjects. Measured as number and 
percentage o f factoids.
Measures the degree o f effectiveness of 
the organization, based on the C2 
approach (Nominal, Edge)
Measures the efficiency of the 
organization when using time as 
indication of cost.
Measures the efficiency of the 
organization when using effort as 
indication of cost.
The time to first correct and complete 
identification by any participant relative 
to the time available (Alberts, 2011).
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3.5 DATA ANALYSIS
The data measurements expected from the ELICIT datalogs are as follows:
3.5.1 General Measurements
Table 12. General Measurements
Name Value Type Description
Duration Number Duration o f a run (in agent’s time, 
measured in Minutes)
Compression factor Number Compression of time used to 
accelerate agent runs (e.g., 0.1 means 
1 minute in agent’s time is 10 minutes 
in human’s time)
This input variable will be recorded 
and changed if required.
Total Shares Number Number of shares performed by all 
members
Total Posts Number Number of posts performed by all 
members
Total Pulls Number Number of pulls performed by all 
members
Total IDs Number Number of IDs performed by all 
members
List of Sense Making 
agent files
Text Filename of agents file configuration
Workload Number Measured as the number o f actions 
requiring information processing 
work; that is, number of share 




Table 13. Social Measurements
Name Value Type Description
Interactions activity 
(mean value)
Number Mean value of interaction activities 




Number [0..1] The ratio of inter and intra team 
interactions (i.e., shares) divided by 
total number o f interactions.
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3.5.3 Informational Measurements
Table 14. Informational Measurements











Number of factoids accessible to organization
Quality o f ID 
50% through 
event by CCO
[0...100%] Quality of Interactions, Self-Synchronization, Mission 
Effectiveness and Mission Efficiency (given 
Effectiveness) (Manso & Nunes, 2007; McEver, Hayes & 
Martin, 2007; Martin & McEver, 2008).
Quality o f ID 
at the end of 
the event by 
CCO
o o o Quality of Interactions, Self-Synchronization, Mission 
Effectiveness and Mission Efficiency (given 
Effectiveness) (Manso & Nunes, 2007; McEver, Hayes & 
Martin, 2007; Martin & McEver, 2008)..




[0...100%] Quality of Interactions, Self-Synchronization, Mission 
Effectiveness and Mission Efficiency (given 
Effectiveness) (Manso & Nunes, 2007; McEver, Hayes & 
Martin, 2007; Martin & McEver, 2008).
Quality o f ID 
at the end of 
the event by 
JFACC
[0...100%] Quality of Interactions, Self-Synchronization, Mission 
Effectiveness and Mission Efficiency (given 
Effectiveness) (Manso & Nunes, 2007; McEver, Hayes & 
Martin, 2007; Martin & McEver, 2008)..
Quality of ID 
50% through 
event by JFC
[0...100%] Quality of Interactions, Self- 
Synchronization, Mission Effectiveness and Mission 
Efficiency (given Effectiveness) (Manso & Nunes, 2007; 
McEver, Hayes & Martin, 2007; Martin & McEver, 
2008).
Quality o f ID 
at the end of 
the event by 
JFACC
[0...100%] Quality of Interactions, Self-Synchronization, Mission 
Effectiveness and Mission Efficiency (given 
Effectiveness) (Manso & Nunes, 2007; McEver, Hayes & 
Martin, 2007; Martin & McEver, 2008).
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3.5.4 Shared Awareness Critical Measurements
Table 15. Shared Awareness Critical Measurements
Name Value Type Description
Number o f Partially 
Correct IDs
[0..4 * nbrSubjects Number o f partially correct 
identifications 
provided by subjects
Time of First Correct 
ID
Number The time to first correct and complete 
identification by any participant
CSSync (Cognitive 
Self-Synchronization)
Number [0..1] Cognitive self-synchronization value 
(Marco & Moffat, 2011)
CSSync Uncertainty Number [0..1] Uncertainty measurement associated 
with CSSync (Marco & Moffat, 2011)
These quantitative numbers will be during 18 different model runs as defined in the
following table:
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Table 16. Nominal C2 and Edge C2 Runs 
Nominal C2
IX System Fragmentation 
2X System Fragmentation 





IX System Fragmentation + 50% Noise 
(Best Case)
3X System Fragmentation + 75% Noise 
(Worst Case)
Edge C2
IX System Fragmentation 
2X System Fragmentation 





IX System Fragmentation + 50% Noise 
(Best Case)
3X System Fragmentation + 75% Noise 
(Worst Case)
As this is a comparison case study, I will compare the nominal AOC to the Edge AOC 
for trends and deviations. The baseline for both types of AOCs will be 1X System 
Fragmentation and/or 50% noise.
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Figure 31. IX System Fragmentation Number o f Correct IDs, Nominal
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Edge and Nominal organizations both find the final solution but a nominal construct 
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Figure 32. 1X System Fragmentation Quality o f IDs, Edge
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Figure 33. IX System Fragmentation Quality o f IDs, Nominal
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Figure 34. Color definitions
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Using Quality of ID as a yardstick, the Edge organization tends for some individuals to 
have better understanding early, but the nominal organization tends to have closer group 
understanding.
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Figure 35. IX Self-Synchronization, Edge
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Figure 36. IX Self-Synchronization. Nominal
When I look at the Self-Synchronization (cognitive) charts, the Edge organization synchs 
early and late, with the Nominal organization bringing more along earlier.
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3.5.6 2X System Fragmentation Edge as compared to Nominal
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Figure 37. 2X System Fragmentation Number of IDs. Edge
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Figure 38. 2X System Fragmentation Number o f Correct IDs, Nominal
As System Fragmentation increases, I see the same pattern as the Nominal organization 
tends to bring all along in understanding earlier.
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Figure 39. 2X System Fragmentation Quality o f IDs, Edge
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Figure 40. 2X System Fragmentation Quality o f IDs, Nominal
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As system fragmentation rate doubles, not all are even able to complete understanding in 
the nominal organization.
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Figure 42. 2X Self-Synchronization, Nominal
With double fragmentation the pattern of more people Self-Synchronization earlier when 
compared with the Nominal organization
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3.5.7 3X System Fragmentation Edge as Compared to Nominal
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Figure 44. 3X System Fragmentation Number of IDs, Nominal
As System Fragmentation becomes obnoxious at three times the initial setting, the 
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Figure 45. 3X System Fragmentation Quality of IDs, Edge
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Figure 46. 3X System Fragmentation Quality o f IDs, Nominal
137
At triple fragmentation, the Nominal organization still cannot achieve a Quality of ID by 
all leaders. With triple fragmentation the Quality o f ID’s have shifted to earlier.








□  Wk WHENOu)



















k b N d
CAKXAtL 0.9)




















0 O W R A U
0 UncO*JSAU
□  UK WWW
□ une WV€N(d)









































Figure 48. 3X Self-Synchronization, Nominal
Continuing to increase system fragmentation has resulted in the Nominal organization 
experiencing earlier many more individuals synchronizing, but at a certain time in the 
process the self-synchronization actually decreases. Now I will analyze how increasing 
noise is reflected in the two different organizational structures.
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3.5.8 50% Noise, Edge as Compared to Nominal
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Figure 49. 50% Noise Number of IDs, Edge
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Figure 50. 50% Noise Number of IDs, Nominal
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In the noise baseline the number o f problem solvers are early and late, whereas in the 
nominal organization all slowly progress toward the answer in a more group centric 
pattern.
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Figure 51. 50% Noise Quality of IDs, Edge
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Figure 52. 50% Noise Quality of IDs, Nominal
The CCO quality of ID (red line) moves earlier in the baseline noise level event in an 
Edge organization as compared to the Nominal organization.
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Figure 54. 50% Noise Self-Synchronization, Nominal
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In both types o f organizations (at baseline noise load) self-synchronization happens early 
and late with self-synchronization happening with an Edge organization earlier in the 
overall process.
3.5.9 66% Noise, Edge as Compared to Nominal
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Figure 55. 66% Noise Number of IDs, Edge
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Figure 56. 66% Noise Number o f IDs, Nominal
As noise increases, the Edge organization tends to plane off in number o f correct IDs 
until the end of the event, whereas the Nominal is always getting better.
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Figure 57. 66% Noise Quality of IDs, Edge
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Figure 58. 66% Noise Quality of IDs, Nominal
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As noise increases, the JFC is late to have quality of ID’s in both Edge and Nominal 
organization.
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Figure 59. 66% Noise Self-Synchronization, Edge
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Figure 60. 66% Noise Self-Synchronization, Nominal
Increasing noise seems to have no effect on either Edge or Nominal in determining self­
synchronization.
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3.5.10 75% Noise, Edge as Compared to Nominal
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Figure 61. 75% Noise Number of IDs, Edge
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Figure 62. 75%  Noise Self-Synchronization, Nominal
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As noise moves to the extreme, the nominal organization continues to bring all in 
understanding.
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Figure 63. 75% Noise Quality o f IDs, Nominal
As compared to system fragmentation the CCO, JFACC and JFC all have a high quality 
of ID. The JFC tends to be later in the Edge organization.
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Figure 64. 75% Noise Self-Synchronization, Edge
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Figure 65. 75% Noise Self-Synchronization, Nominal
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As noise moves to the extreme, the Nominal organization and Edge organization both 
tend to level off in the middle of the event with the Nominal picking up sooner in being 
more self-synchronized.
What this exercise has demonstrated is that there is a relationship between the 
human decision-making structure and the underlying technical structure. I push the Edge 
organization to the extreme by having everyone communicate with everyone else, and 
there are limits to NCW, as not all measures improve moving toward Edge.
3.6 TRUSTWORTHINESS AND VALIDITY
This researcher understands the potential exists for criticism concerning validity 
and trustworthiness of knowledge (research output) elicited through an artificially 
constructed C2 model study. Accepting and acknowledging that criticisms exist will help 
to curb known and unknown researcher bias. Only by accounting for potential criticisms 
is there a chance to mitigate any unattended gaps in research that would result in a 
dissertation that would have no merit and be a waste of paper, ink, and heartbeats.
ELICIT is the Experimental Laboratory for Investigating Collaboration 
Information-sharing and Trust. Developed under the Command and Control Research 
Program (CCRP) within the Office o f the DoD CIO, ELICIT uses an online multi-user 
software platform to conduct experiments and simulations in information-sharing and 
trust. The configurable ELICIT software platform allows users to precisely model 
specific Command and Control processes, as well as Edge organization processes and to 
fully instrument all interactions. The original project objective was to conduct a series of 
online experiments to compare the relative efficiency and effectiveness of various 
organizational structures in performing tasks that require decision making and
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collaboration. The baseline experiment task was to identify the who, what, where and 
when of an adversary attack based on information factoids that become known to a team.
To date, experiments and have been run with live subjects and software agents at 
numerous military and civilian locations including Air Force Research Labs, Army 
Research Labs, Boston University, Harvard, George Mason University, West Point, the 
Naval Post Graduate School, Naval War College, National Defense University, the Army 
War College, the Portuguese Military Academy, and in Canada, the UK, Chile, and 
Singapore. ELICIT exercises are also used as classroom teaching tools.
ELICIT has been developed and refined over a period of eight years. Direct 
development investment by the CCRP has been approximately two million dollars. 
Significant additional resources (including human participants) were provided by 
researchers directly. ELICIT has been vetted and refined by an international group of 
researchers. The software agents were developed and tuned based on data and experience 
with live participants. It is rare to have a research platform that supports both human and 
agent participants. This allows for models to be developed relatively inexpensively with 
software agents and then validated with humans. Given how difficult it is to arrange for 
large, suitable, subject pools, even if sufficient funding were available, it would be very 
difficult to recreate ELICIT.
3.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
The nature o f war historically adapts to the technology available. Metaphorically, 
ancient military operations were more like solid mechanics, and industrial age combat 
could be well represented by fluid mechanics. The term that best applies to knowledge 
age combat is ‘Cloud’ centric, in which a small world of knowledge drives the
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understanding of battlefield truth. Knowledge age combat will rely on hierarchical silos 
of systems in which only a few have the full picture of the overall situation because no 
single individual or organization has yet to prove they can hold and understand the 
cacophony o f available data. I designed this research to understand some of the core 
issues associated with operational Air Power C2 in the information age and to develop a 
conceptual framework to analyze improving operational capability. The assumption is the 
AOC is comprised o f two networks, the technical (data/information flow) and human 
(defined by social networking where decisions are made), with limited touch points. One 
o f the goals o f this effort was to use ELICIT and artificial software agents to vary AOC 
data flow (increasing noise and system fragmentation/network fragmentation) and 
measure the change with social networking metrics. Another was to vary organizational 
structure (Nominal and Edge) to determine the correlation to overall data/information 
flow through the system. Using ELICIT is an attempt to move C2 research from a 
qualitative model towards a quantitative model with some repeatability as a validation 
metric.
In the battle for Crete in World War II, the British broke the German crypto code 
and knew who was coming, when they were coming, and how strong they would be -  and 
they still lost the battle. Having better C2 may not win battles or wars. Therefore, the 
study of C2 is a relevant subject for a PhD dissertation and is a subject that is worthy of a 
lifetime o f inquiry. We are on the cusp o f the knowledge age. What that means for the 
face o f conflict is yet to be determined.
What can be determined is the significance of this work as part o f the C2 
knowledge base. This paper provides three distinct practical vectors:
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1) Theoretical - Binding theory by joining Social Networking Theory and 
Information Theory into a single framework for evaluation. I used the 
resulting conceptual framework to accomplish foundational research on a 
representative Air Power C2 node. By using this new conceptual 
framework, I have accomplished a quantitative evaluation by something 
other than mission treads, field exercise, or actual combat. This 
foundational work has the potential to lead to understanding the value or 
lack of value of a C2 approach.
2) Methodological - 1 used a case study research technique in a System of 
Systems venue designed to advance the Engineering Management 
discipline. My method is to use information theory supporting nuclear 
power plants as a conceptual framework for a case study researching an 
operational level military node. 1 used social networking measures as a 
framework to determine organizational improvement in an operational 
level military node. The outcome is to use both information theory and 
social networking concepts in a non-traditional setting.
3) Practical -  There is hope that this research could start the process required 
to achieve some sort o f federated C2 structure, in particular, how to 
explore the JFACC- Forward concept operationally. A concrete outcome 
would be to create a measure that can be used on any distributed C2 
environment that could be incorporated into Operational Testing (OT), 
design, and experimentation of new C2 systems.
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3.8 SUMMARY
The fallacy of creating a flat earth of information where the operator has access to 
a 1 -to-1 representation of reality may result only in the human operator quickly becoming 
the organizational single point of failure. In an open bandwidth milieu, an ever- 
increasing number o f levels of networks based on security and system/sub-system 
segmentation is a vital venue for research. The power and advantage o f the knowledge 
age is best represented by the time it took to change the standard operating principle of 
‘give the hijacked plane to the hijackers’ to ‘fight the hijackers to the best of your 
ability.’
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to conduct an analysis o f a representative 
Air Power Operational C2 node using a case study designed to elicit fundamental 
understanding. The goal is to determine how a representative AOC C2 system changes 
varying noise and system fragmentation when operating in either a Nominal or Edge 
organizational construct. To do this, I answered two questions: 1) what conceptual 
framework can be constructed using social networking theory and information theory to 
evaluate a representative Air Power C2 node, and 2) what elucidation results from the 
application o f the framework on a representative C2 node?
Contingency theory states that there is no best way to organize; not all ways to 
organize are equally effective. The theory states qualitative rules observed through 
research on how companies organized in specific contexts and how organizations with 
different structures perform in those contexts.
My research gnaws at the core tenets of C2 in the information age and 
accomplishes the fundamental research and validation that needs to take place. The
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critical question I search for is to determine if the tenets of Network Center Warfare are 
unbounded. Initial research o f command and control decision-making have tended to 
indicate either that information had little effect on decision-making, or that any effects 
from information were dominated by variability between decision makers (Daniel, Holt, 
& Mathieson, 2002; Mathieson, 2001).
Others researchers call out in loud voices for this type of research. For instance, 
Tolk, Bair, and Diallo (2013) state:
Interoperability o f two systems implies mathematical equivalency of their 
conceptualization. In other words, interoperability is only given in the intersection 
of two systems. This is counterintuitive to many current views that assume that by 
interoperability the union of the provided capabilities becomes available. We 
therefore need an operational frame that helps to orchestrate individual and 
independent technical solutions, (p. 5)
This research does not just deal with a US model; it brings in joint and coalition members 
and looks at the interaction. The research tries to determine if too much or too little of a 
good thing (data/information) impacts organizational performance.
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CHAPTER FOUR - RESULTS
The importance o f the results is not the values resulting from a detailed analysis 
o f the data provided. This case study was exploratory in nature to gain basic elicitation.
I was able to create a conceptual model, and from that 1 was able to derive how to 
organize a physical model that represents air power at the operational level of war. A 
CST bound literature review developed Network Centric Warfare as the key C2 tenant 
moving toward the future. By using a pluralist approach, I have epistemologically 
defined an unexplored relationship between the C2 system and the people that use them. 
By increasing noise and system fragmentation in a valid C2 operational model and 
getting results, I have proved there is a measurable relationship between C2 systems and 
the human decision organization, which may be greater than mere correlation. 1 pushed 
the model organization from a Nominal structure to an extreme “Edge” organization. 
According to John Scott (1991), one should expect that many weak ties are more likely to 
introduce new information and differing perspectives than tightly closed networks with 
many redundant ties. It other words it is better to have connections to a variety of 
networks than many connections in a single network. Robin Dunbar suggested that a 
human network is perhaps limited to about 150 members due to the physical capacity of 
humans. Mark Granovetter (2007) found there are homophilic tendencies in any clique 
where each member o f the clique knows more or less what the other members know.
Was one of these factors or were hundreds o f other factors responsible for the change in 
my C2 measurements? Future research can quantitatively decide those relationships. 
What I have proven is there is a need to seek to understand the fundamentals and
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expected key C2 results as we move deeper into the Information Age. The following 
network results legitimize organizational structure changes the measurable C2 factors in 
an AOC.
4.1 ORGANIZATIONS
Edge organization structure results are as depicted below (each 1 represents possible 
communication path). It is easy to see how far I have pushed this organization:
t/l l /l  l/j l /l  l/>
ASOC









T a n k e r
Figure 66. Edge organization structure results
The following visual depiction o f the same Edge organization:
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NALE
Figure 61. Visual depiction of Edge organization structure results
In my Edge construct, each organization/individual has symmetric communications with 
all. This would imply total data sharing. It is the Sirens call toward the rocks that total 
Edge offers.
160




Edges With Duplicates 783
Total Edges 784
Self-Loops 1
Reciprocated Vertex Pair Ratio Not Applicable
Reciprocated Edge Ratio Not Applicable
Connected Components 1
Single-Vertex Connected Components 0
Maximum Vertices in a Connected Component 28
Maximum Edges in a Connected Component 784
Maximum Geodesic Distance (Diameter) 1
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Minimum Closeness Centrality 0.037
Maximum Closeness Centrality 0.037
Average Closeness Centrality 0.037





Minimum Eigenvector Centrality 0.036
Maximum Eigenvector Centrality 0.037
Average Eigenvector Centrality 0.036
Median Eigenvector Centrality 0.036
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Minimum Clustering Coefficient 1.000
Maximum Clustering Coefficient 1.000
Average Clustering Coefficient 1.000
Median Clustering Coefficient 1.000
Nominal organization structure results are (each 1 represents a possible communication 
path):
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Figure 68. Nominal organization structure results
X
M
Figure 69. Visual depiction of Nominal organization structure results
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Edges With Duplicates 352
Total Edges 437
Self-Loops 0
Reciprocated Vertex Pair Ratio Not
Applicable
Reciprocated Edge Ratio Not
Applicable
Connected Components 1
Single-Vertex Connected Components 0
Maximum Vertices in a Connected Component 28
Maximum Edges in a Connected Component 437
Maximum Geodesic Distance (Diameter) 2
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Minimum Betweenness Centrality 0.881
Maximum Betweenness Centrality 12.145
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Median Betweenness Centrality 3.125
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4.1.2 Master Data Chart
When I first started working with ELICIT there was only one analysis tool. The 
tool provided quantitative results and in some cases, I had to manually manipulate the 
results to display them in a graphic form. The goal all along was to use C2 measurements 
that had validity in the community. At the end of the project a new ELICIT graphic 
analysis tool became available and output of the new tool was already in accepted 
measurements o f C2. The following Master Data chart was the data captured before the 
new ELICIT analysis tool (see images starting on Page 140) was available. Whether
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evaluating the data in the Master Data Chart or evaluating the graphic output provided by 
the newest ELICIT analysis tool both results point to the same conclusion: When there is 
a change in either organizations or C2 systems that support them, there is a measurable 
C2 effect. We may never have a common definition of C2, but that should not be a 
barrier to measuring and making better the overall socio-technical macro system used to 
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CHAPTER FIVE -  CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, 
AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This dissertation is a Case Study using Critical System Thinking (CST) to 
address the following hypothesis: is there a recognizable (and discoverable) 
relationship between the social (human) network and technical supporting 
network? Other researchers perceive there is a relationship between the technical 
network and the human network in Command and Control. Cliff Joslyn and Luis 
M. Rocha write:
Our world is becoming an interlocking collective of Socio-Technical 
Organizations (STOs): large numbers of groups o f people hyperlinked by 
information channels and interacting with computer systems, and which 
themselves interact with a variety of physical systems in order to maintain them 
under conditions of good control. Primary examples o f STOs include Command 
and Control Organizations (CCOs) such as 911/Emergency Response Systems 
(911/ERS) and military organizations, as well as utility infrastructures such as 
power grids, gas pipelines, and the Internet. The architecture of such systems is 
shown in Fig. 1, where a physical system is controlled by a computer-based 
information network, which in turn interacts with a hierarchically structured 
organization of semiotic agents.
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Figure 70. The architecture o f STOs (Modification of Joslyn & Rocha, 2000)
The potential impacts on planetary economy and ecology are just 
beginning to be understood.
The vast complexity and quantity o f information involved in these systems 
makes simulation approaches necessary, and yet the existing formalisms available 
for simulation are not sufficient to reflect their full characteristics. (Joslyn and 
Rocha, 2000)
We can begin to understand the relationship between the human network 
and the technical network by examining the system under change. Changes in the 
technical network should result in changes in the social network, and changes in
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the social network should result in a measurable difference in utilization of the 
technical network. This paper has demonstrated that what I posit is valid. Using a 
quantitative method supplied by ELICIT, I have demonstrated that the tenets of 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) are bound. Contingency theory states that there 
is no best way to organize; not all ways to organize are equally effective.
Knowing NCW is bound, and as we move deeper into the Information Age, we 
need to understand Air Power C2 from a scientific approach to maximize its 
utility.
5.1 CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this research is to conduct an analysis of a representative 
Air Power Operational C2 node using a case study design to elicit fundamental 
understanding. I have achieved this purpose. The primary research question was 
to determine how a representative AOC C2 system changes, varying noise and 
system fragmentation, when in either a Nominal or Edge organizational construct. 
In some ways (overall early cognitive self-synchronization), the results show 
Nominal as the better performing organization, though in other ways, Edge (no 
loss of cognitive self-synchronization over the entire event) is better. The 
analysis provides understanding that the AOC is a socio-technical system of 
systems, and simple solutions, such as providing more data, may not support 
better decision-making, which could lead to better outcomes. My linked research 
question was to determine whether critical systems thinking could apply to 
military Command and Control. It can; CST creates an environment for debate, is 
complementary between various system approaches, and encourages pluralism.
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My second research question was to determine whether NCW is unbound.
I have found that NCW is bound. Moving an organization to an extreme version 
o f Edge did not make all measures better. NCW is a robust theory, but by itself, it 
does not define how to make any macro organization/system perform better from 
an a priori perspective.
5.1.1 ELICIT
I modified the ELICIT C2 model to conduct this work. The data produced 
were extensive and required a previously developed analysis tool and a new 
analysis tool, custom built, to accomplish data extraction. Both C2 analysis tools 
work, but there are no manuals for their use; with the micro academic C2 
community supporting the analysis tools, they are best defined as ‘clunky/ 
Although the ELICIT model has been validated against humans, the analysis tools 
have not been validated. C2 modeling to understand complex systems provides 
one more arrow in the quiver to evaluate operational C2 as compared to actual 
warfare, historical studies, field experiments, or just buying more, faster, and 
‘better’ sensors and communication gear. ELICIT was vital to this work. As an 
academic tool made available to all, with the only caveat being the output, it 
shows its proclivity for emancipation or improvement of the C2 community.
5.1.2 Move towards System of Systems Engineering (SoSE)
Powerful and dynamic forces are increasingly relevant to today’s military 
C2 environment. The advent o f ubiquitous worldwide communications is 
increasing the rate at which knowledge grows, and is shaping how it flows 
through our systems. The inexorable progress of technological innovation creates
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possibilities as it destroys established processes and augments current knowledge. 
Traditional systems engineering pursues creation of an isomorphic engineering 
model. In today's dynamic environment, new C2 problems are emerging that 
resist isomorphic modeling. Traditional systems engineering approaches are not 
sufficient. SoSE extends that systemic perspective to find solutions for the 
problems that systems of systems create (Kern, 2006). SoSE requires the use of 
Minimum Critical Specifications (Taylor & Felten, 1996), which stipulates only 
essential constraints to achieve overall performance level required by a system. 
Excessively specific documents limit flexibility in the operation and the system. 
Minimal specificity permits integration of the system to produce consistent levels 
o f performance. The methodology in documentation supports a federation of 
systems in which no central authority provides direction and autonomy; thus, 
heterogeneity and distribution hold the organization in place through 
participation, cooperation and collaboration (Krygiel, 1999).
Another principle of SoSE is content analysis. Strength of SoSE vice 
traditional systems engineering is use of context analysis to address problems 
with a high degree of contextual influence. The theory o f context concerns 
“relevant circumstances, factors, conditions, and patterns that both constrain and 
enable the system solution development, deployment, operation, and 
transformation” (Keating et. al, 2003). Methodology that addresses successful 
context analysis includes a process for continual evaluation o f how context affects 
analysis, design, and transformation. In SoSE theory, one may expect that failure 
to adequately account for context will show a strategic failure o f some type for the
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system (Keating et. al, 2004). One C2 structure does not fit every C2 problem. 
Only by understanding the C2 structure within a given context can one improve 
the issue. Moving all toward edge or any other change should be understood 
within the larger context.
A third SoSE principle is Boundary Establishment and Control. “A 
boundary separates a system and its environment. Defining a boundary is 
tantamount to defining the thing that is to be considered as a ‘system' and those 
other things that are to be considered as the system’s ‘environment” (Leonard & 
Clemson, 1984). SoSE recognizes the problem inherent in establishing boundaries 
and acknowledges that boundaries change over time. In the documentation, 
boundary changes should be processed and potential impact mitigated. The AOC 
does not have to consist o f hardware and people in one fixed location. We self­
limit when we define it in those terms.
A salient factor o f SoSE is iteration. Iteration in complex systems is 
recognizing a process that evolves with additional information and understanding 
o f the system and the environment in which it operates. Failure to iterate a 
problematic system solution assumes perfect initial determination of the system -  
an unworthy assumption for any complex system (Gibson, 1991). Documents that 
incorporate iteration assume a changing environment with shifts in condition and 
requirements. Iteration should be a continuous reevaluation process with many 
parallel loops (Bahill et.al, 2002). As the AOC moves forward in time there is not 
one optimal solution; there is a solution for today and a solution for tomorrow.
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This paper attempts to provide additional information and understanding of the 
‘problem.'
SoSE recognizes Complementary Law, in which any two perspectives will 
reveal truths regarding that system that are neither entirely independent nor 
entirely compatible (Basic Ideas of General System Theory, 1936). 
Complementary law includes multiple views and perspectives, particularly in the 
formative stage o f a SoS effort, to ensure a robust approach and design. Failure to 
include multiple perspectives is recognizably limiting to the eventual solution 
(Clemson. 1984). Using CST to observe the AOC from both a technical 
perspective and social perspective incorporates Complementary Law.
A sixth recognized aspect of SoSE is transformation. Only through actual 
transformation do changes occur: resources are expended, transformation 
objectives pursued, and results (intended and unintended) emerge. Adjustments to 
strategy, based on intended and unintended results achieved, must maintain the 
correct trajectory for transformation (Keating et. al, 2004). Simons (YEAR) 
agrees any system must plan for moves from stable form to stable form. Complex 
systems will develop and evolve within an overall architecture much more rapidly 
if there are stable intermediate forms (Simons, 1969). Methods that should be 
detected in user documents include a process to encourage readjustment to both 
intended and unintended results as the SoS moves from one stable form to 
another. It is not expected to move from a starting point today to some future 
ending point without a process to vector the effort continually with planned stable 
intermediate points.
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A seventh principle of SoSE is self-organization, in which complex 
systems tend to organize themselves, and characteristic structural and behavioral 
patterns result from interaction among system parts. Self-organizing reinforces the 
homeostasis principle wherein systems survive only as long as all essential 
variables are maintained within their physiological limits (Clemson, 1984). 
Maximizing autonomy (freedom of action and decision) within minimal system 
level constraints achieves this status. Constraints are limited to those necessary for 
system integration.
An eighth principle is System Control. In management structure, the 
potential to act effectively belongs to that subset o f management that first acquires 
proper information. Information confers power. Any situation can potentially be 
resolved in numerous ways by numerous subsets of the manager. Failure to 
recognize this potential (or overzealous adherence to chain of command) robs an 
organization o f creative solutions, ability to recognize crucial facts, trends, and 
events, and a large fraction o f its overall decision-making capability. Redundancy 
of potential command increases speed of response, ability to detect novel events, 
information, trends, threats, and opportunities, creativity and decision-making, 
and comprehensiveness o f decision-making (Leonard & Clemson, 1984). 
Assessing expected information flow in requirements generation, according to the 
International Council on System Engineering, does not occur in a vacuum. An 
essential part o f requirements development is the operations concept, the implicit 
design concept that accompanies it, and associated technology demands. System 
needs cannot be established without checking impact (achievability) on lower
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level elements. Information flow and system control is a ‘top-down' and ‘bottom- 
up’ iteration and balancing process. “Control for a System of Systems is achieved 
by maximizing the autonomy of subsystems. The SoSE methodology must 
appreciate target designs that provide for the highest levels o f subsystem 
autonomy. Control is achieved by establishment of subsystem performance 
expectations that maximize overall system o f systems performance” (Keating et. 
al, 2004).
The ninth principle is rigorous analysis. According to Keating, et al. 
(2004), the SoSE methodology is intended to provoke rigorous analysis resulting 
in the potential for alternative decision, action, and interpretations for evolving 
complex system of systems solutions. The SoSE methodology analyzes and 
frames problems and their context, manages emergent conditions, and takes 
decisive action. The methodology provokes higher levels of inquiry, systemic 
analysis, and advanced understanding of seemingly intractable problems en route 
to robust solutions (Keating et al., 2004).
Rigorous analysis does not rely on simple ‘cut and paste’ or standard 
‘cookie cutter’ approaches to problem solving. The underlying philosophical 
approach applies core concepts from General System Theory.
The tenth standard and final subset is system outcome achievement. 
According to Keating (2004), another principle of SoSE is the ability to produce 
desirable results,
Metasystem performance must ultimately be judged on whether or not it 
continues to meet expectations for positive impact on the problematic situation or
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continued fulfillment o f an identified need/mission. A problem for SoSE is the 
concern for shifting expectations of stakeholders that may change fluidly 
throughout the life o f the system of systems (Keating et al., 2004).
Measures o f performance must be established carefully to allow SoSE to 
focus on output measurement as well as outcome. By incorporating SoSE 
principles into designing my AOC, I have an opportunity to move far past the 
marketing phrase, ‘right information, at the right time, in the right place, in the 
right format,' to an engineering solution that actually has the potential to improve 
overall capability.
5.2 IMPLICATIONS
Every research project has an implied or a specified strategy. The strategy 
needs to match the intellectual goal. The intellectual question that requires 
resolution is always: ‘What will be achieved at the end o f the research process?' 
See Appendix A for a complete breakdown of the analysis o f this work. 
Quantitative research is designed to help people make sense of what is going on in 
the world around them (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). Case study work offers the 
ontological assumption that the aim of the study is to represent various views of 
multiple realities. The literature review indicates the C2 universe is diverse. Every 
nation state thinks about C2. Every service practices C2 differently. I hope that 
what I achieve at the end of the research process is to provide some clarity on the 
future o f C2 research.
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I have employed the following strategies to mitigate potential criticisms to 
this scholarly research. The various thought camps (hard science vs. soft science) 
are not two stovepipes o f either/or; they are bookend arguments o f the scientific 
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Understanding the bookend arguments, the conversation quickly moves 
back to defining what science is. A classic scientific research approach implies 
qualitative research being the prerequisite to accomplish quantitative evaluation. 
Look at how Newton worked and how he applied the scientific approach: he used 
his senses to see the apple fall from the tree. Through inductive reasoning, he was 
able to formulate that two objects attract each other (empiricism). His reasoning 
was a qualitative finding. Only after the reasoning did he gather the data and 
conduct experiments to test his expectations/hypothesis. Through his use of both 
qualitative and quantitative methods, he was able to produce the Universal Law of 
Gravitation.
Myers’ (2000) argument is not to address the ‘weakness,’ but to quantify 
the strengths o f qualitative research:
A major strength of the qualitative approach is the depth to which 
explorations are conducted and descriptions are written, usually resulting in 
sufficient details for the reader to grasp the idiosyncrasies of the situation.
(Myers, 2000)
By moving the point of reference, simple defense can quickly become 
active defense. This research is qualitative; one goal of this research is only to 
set the stage for further research into understanding of the fundamentals of Air 
Power C2.
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5.3 FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS
Command and Control systems for Air Power will most likely remain 
warfighters using systems to artificially represent reality, and respond to and 
influence that reality. Airpower will provide a critical umbrella o f global reach 
and global strike for most military operations. It should be expected that 
something like Air Tasking Order will be the mechanism that is used for self­
synchronization and synchronization with other components. Future research 
needs to address three C2 subjects utilizing a scientific process. The first research 
that needs to be undertaken is to determine the underlying non-changing 
principles of Air Power C2. The second area of research is to understand how C2 
can be employed as an offensive weapon. Third, we must ask how we can 
maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of the macro C2 socio-technical system 
in an information-saturated milieu.
5.3.1 Philosophical Issues
Theoretical paradigm has been defined as “a loose collection of logically 
held together assumptions, concepts, and propositions that orientates thinking and 
research” (Bogdan & Biklan, 1982), or it could be defined as a “basic belief 
system or world view that guides the investigation” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).
Positivism defines natural and social sciences as measureable autonomous 
facts within the realm of individual perception of reality (Gabriel, 1990). 
Therefore, reality is composed of discrete elements that can be recognized and 
classified (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Hirschman, 1986, Tsoukas, 1989). Research 
based on positivism is theory-testing based on deduction (Layder, 1993).
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If  a researcher does not fall totally into the positivism camp, the other 
epistemological orientation is interpretivism (anti-positivism), which broadly 
defines, "any kind of research that produces findings not arrived at by means of 
statistical procedures or other means o f quantification” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
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Table 21. Basic belief systems of alternate inquiry paradigms
Item Positivism Critical Theory Constructivism Realism
S£ Naive Historical Critical Critical
o Realism: Realism: Relativism: Realism:
Ro reality is ‘virtual’ reality multiple local reality is
‘real’ and shaped and specific ‘real’ but
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Case studies [like this one] have unjustifiably acquired a reputation for 
being semi-anecdotal investigation o f the small details of individual 
circumstances, research that is incapable o f generating significant empirical or 
theoretical advances in knowledge (Leo, 2008, p. 2).The two philosophies that 
form the basis of a majority of research are quantitative and qualitative (Creswell, 
2003). Those philosophies can be associated with other terms and concepts:
• Positivism (quantitative) is a concept that has a strong relationship 
to empiricism, nominalism, and mathematics.
• Naturalism (qualitative) is an argument that relates to 
contextualism and symbolic interrelationism.
Both philosophies tend to be associated with pragmatic thought, and reject 
idealism and realism.
This Case Study uses naturalism as its scientific method as it is a 
pragmatic way to approach so complicated a subject as Air Power C2.
5,3.2 Theoretical Issues
The future o f C2 in the Information Age is a conundrum. How the 
antagonists of some future war organize, equip, and train has not been set in 
theoretical “stone.” Confusion begins with no common lexicon on exactly what is 
meant by the simple terms ‘command’ and ‘control.’ Will information continue to 
grow into a bane or will it become another offensive weapon available for 
exploitation? Theory like Network Centric Warfare is being developed and tested. 




The value o f repeatable C2 case study research should be judged against 
the canon of science and ethics for viability, as it is not historical in nature nor 
should C2 be ‘experimented’ within the heat of battle. I have evaluated this 
dissertation against the four canons of science for viability and the results are:
1) Determinism- assumes the universe is orderly. All events have 
causes. The hypothesis is deterministic, as it assumes there is a 
connection between the human domain and the technical domain 
providing the abstraction o f reality for the warfighters.
2) Empiricism- The best way to determine the orderly principles of 
the world is to observe carefully. This dissertation carefully takes a 
subset of facts and conditions and evaluates them in detail utilizing 
Critical System Thinking, observing both pro and counter 
arguments.
3) Parsimony- When two competing theories are equal in explaining 
empirical observations, one should choose the simpler, or more 
parsimonious, of the two. We should be careful in developing any 
new theories. Network Centric Warfare has been observed as to 
whether it ‘fits’ all conditions.
4) Testability- This is the assumption that any scientific theories 
should be testable. Testing in combat is not viable across a theater 
scale; a human validated model has accomplished testing.
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From ethics, canons can lead to ethical considerations o f the research. For 
evaluation in this framework, I will consider five ethics: Utilitarian, Rights, 
Fairness or Justice, Common Good, and Virtue:
1) A utilitarian approach provides the most good or does the least 
harm, as it balances good over harm. Using a human viable mode 
(ELICIT) does not harm humans nor force organizations either to 
reorganize or to be equipped with costly new kits.
2) A rights approach uses a common set of rights that all should have. 
Such rights include the right to make one's own choices in life, the 
right to be told the truth, the right not to be injured, and the right to 
some degree of privacy. This research is not funded by any 
organization and is accomplished purely to understand 
fundamental C2 issues.
3) Fairness or Justice is the concept that all should be treated equally. 
Let the ideas in this paper stand on their own merit. It is searching 
for ‘truth,’ and only the validity o f the argument and time should 
judge the final results.
4) Common Good is an approach that suggests relationships between 
society and a compassion for others, especially the vulnerable.
This approach also calls for common conditions to be set for the 
welfare of everyone.
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5) A common list of virtues are honesty, courage, compassion,
generosity, tolerance, love, fidelity, integrity, fairness, self-control, 
and prudence.
Researching C2 using a model based case study is a viable axiological 
technique.
5.3.4 Methodological Issues
There is little literature available that validates capturing data to support 
building a thematic lens to provide elicitation on Command and Control. What I 
present is that there is a recognizable (and discoverable) relationship between the 
social network and technical network. Understanding of that relationship can 
begin by examining the system under change using a repeatable method. Changes 
in the technical network will result in changes in the social network, and changes 
in the social network will result in a measurable difference in utilization o f the 
technical network. The literature review, not being historical in nature, opens 
itself up to scrutiny in that the results may not support the overarching research 
concept. By selecting Critical System Thinking (CST) as an inquiring process, I 
have accomplished a relevant literature search, and the results can be interwoven 
into any emerging C2 theory. Data can be ‘cherry picked,’ and ELICIT and the 
ELICIT analysis tools are predefined. To insure viability, criteria used for 
comparison was developed and refined by Marco Manso in his 2012 paper, 
“N2C2M2 Validation using abELICIT: Design and Analysis of ELICIT runs 
using software agents” presented at the 17th ICCRTS. The reliability o f this study 
is based on following a recognized Case Study research method. An in-depth self- 
analysis o f this paper is available in Appendix A.
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If I have learned anything about Air Power C2,1 have learned I know very 
little. I am trying to accomplish some fundamental understanding. The C2 model I 
am using was provided pro-bono and I had to work within the constraints of the 
model. The only way to address the concerns of qualitative research is to follow a 
well-known model like case study using CST as an inquiry method. In many 
ways, qualitative research has been fighting ‘uphill’ against quantitative research 
for centuries. To address the issue o f qualitative validation in this dissertation, I 
pulled reasoning for the paper by starting at the philosophy, driving it into the 
epistemology, and continuing into the ontology. Using this methodology, one can 
assume CST in a single case study to be a valid approach. Additionally, some may 
point to the lack o f quantitative support in the work and the ELICIT model not 
being robustly realistic. In response, I should point to Macy:
Analysis of very simple and unrealistic models can reveal new theoretical 
ideas that have broad applicability, beyond the stylized models that produced 
them. Pressure to make models more realistic (and agents more cognitively 
sophisticated) is misguided if models become so complex that they are as difficult 
to interpret as natural phenomena. When researchers must resort to higher order 
statistical methods to tease apart the underlying causal processes, the value of 
simulation is largely undermined (2002).
5.3.5 Practical Issues
In his study of airpower in the first Gulf War, James Coyne (1992) notes:
Before the age of electronics and aerospace technology, command and 
control— in the modem sense of the term— was a comparatively minor 
element in warfare. Battles were fought, albeit inefficiently and often
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ineffectively, independent o f the health o f supporting communications, (p. 
x)
This paper using CST (Critical System Thinking) has attempted to 
uncover fundamental concepts o f C2 as they relate to the execution Air Power. 
Two organizational constructs were identified (Nominal and Edge). George Orr 
(1983) uses the term hierarchical organization vise Nominal organization, but the 
thought is same; it is as an organization that:
attempts to turn the entire military force into an extension of the 
commander. Subordinate levels respond in precise and standardized ways 
to his orders and provide him with the data necessary to control the entire 
military apparatus. The emphasis is upon connectivity hierarchy, upon 
global information gathering or upon passing locally obtained information 
to higher levels, and upon centralized management of the global battle, (p. 
109).
At the other end of the spectrum is an Edge organization. In 1983, Orr 
used the term network vise Edge, but again the underlying concept is the same. 
Orr (1983) describes his network/edge concept these terms:
views the commander as controlling only in the sense o f directing a 
cooperative problem solving effort. The emphasis in this style is on 
autonomous operation at all levels, upon the development o f distributed 
systems and architectures, upon networking to share the elements needed 
to detect and resolve possible conflicts, and upon distributed decision 
making processes, (p. 110)
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Just as in 1983, Edge organizations gather and process information with 
the goal that the information will be equally distributed and made available to all 
that need it with the assumption that more and rapidly-transmitted information to 
all levels of command will improve decision-making.
As we enter the Information Age, history has proven that organizations 
can be overwhelmed with their exaction of reality (information) as it is provided 
by their own massive technological infrastructure. The United States Navy guided 
missile cruiser VINCENNES shot down the 290 passengers and crew of Iran Air 
Flight 655 when it fired two missiles on July 3, 1988. In his 1990 book Artificial 
Intelligence at War: An Analysis o f  the Aegis System in Combat, Chris Gray 
(1990) argues that “the Aegis gave the Vincennes' captain and crew the illusion 
that they knew more than they did” (p. 126-139). Also,
'Aegis [the VINCENNES radar system] is a man-machine weapon 
system" [italics in original]; as such, sailors must exercise a healthy 
skepticism about the information they are presented, rather than blindly 
trust the “system” o f which they are unknowingly a part. (p. 126-139)
The practical issues are not just better computer design, or system design, 
or how to organize to use all information that can be provided effectively, or how 
not to be overwhelmed by information. The issue identified in this paper is to 
learn how to understand and discover core C2 concepts by using a quantitative 
repeatable approach. Van Creveld (1991) writes: “The paradox is that, though 
nothing is more important than unit of command, it is impossible for one man to
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know everything. The larger and more complex the forces that he commands, the 
more true this becomes” (p. 109).
One should note that Napoleon used centralized control, and commanded 
85,000 men at Austerlitz with great success; however, he lost control of half his 
force o f 150,000 men at Jena and had no control of his 180,000-man force at 
Leipzig (Van Creveld, 1991). John Boyd in his unpublished notes argues 
convincingly that Napoleon’s military downfall can be attributed directly to his 
use of a highly centralized command and control system. Organization 
uncertainty (entropy) is a condition subject to the will o f all Commanders. Most 
Commanders, just being human, will desire to drive their entropy towards zero. 
Van Creveld (1991) believes that while centralization reduces uncertainty 
(entropy) at the top, it increases that uncertainty (entropy) at the bottom. 
Decentralization has just the opposite effect (Snyder, 1993).
5.4 SUMMARY
One cannot help but look upon the social environment and the underlying 
technological infrastructure we are constructing for Command and Control 
without some trepidation. As the macro C2 system evolves, one should expect it 
to become more structurally complex, as history has demonstrated. Warfighters 
and their technology will always have a symbiotic relationship. Moving forward, 
this should not be a problem in and of itself. We need to recognize the mismatch 
between the optimism brought by science and engineering and the sometimes 
hidden risk of complex system behavior. In complex systems, the sum is always
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greater than the parts. It is well known that any deterministic system will generate 
random-seeming behavior given a long enough period of time.
The philosopher Alfred North Whitehead captured the essential character 
of evolving, adapting systems most elegantly when in the 1920s he considered the 
domain of human social organization:
The social history o f mankind exhibits great organizations in their 
alternating functions o f conditions for progress, and of contrivances for stunting 
humanity. The history of the Mediterranean lands, and of western Europe, is the 
history of the blessing and the curse o f political organizations, o f religious 
organizations, of schemes of thought, of social agencies for large purposes. The 
moment of dominance, prayed for, worked for, sacrificed for, by generations of 
the noblest spirits, marks the turning point where the blessing passes into the 
curse. Some new principle of refreshment is required. The art of progress is to 
preserve order amid change, and to preserve change amid order. (Whitehead, 
1927-28)
We should not sit in the intellectual darkness and hope and pray our 
industrial-military complex “figures out” Air Power C2. It is better to light just 
one candle.
In this dissertation, I have defined the unique contributions“C2 in the 
Information Age” brings to the plethora of C2 thought. I segregated seminal 
authors in both IT and Social Networking into two schools of thought. The IT 
school of thought concentrating on machine themes and would be made up of 
authors such as Shannon (1949), Ashby (1948), Beer (1985), Conant (1976),
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Sommerhoff (1950), Brillouin (1962), Norretranders (1991), and Waelchli (1989). 
The Social Networking school of thought, that I identified as being made up of 
authors that are concerned with the human/organizational themes, consists of 
authors like Mathieu (2000), Carley (1997), Klimoski and Mohammed (1994), 
Sonnenwald and Pierce (1998), Kaplan (1980), Graham (2004), Barnes (1954), 
Hanneman (2005), Granovetter (1973), and Milgram (1967). Between these two 
giant schools of thought, there is a much smaller pool o f authors that write about 
themes that bind both the machine and the human themes from a synthesis 
perspective. This pool consists o f thinkers like Bharadwaj andKonsynski (1999), 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), Aral and Weill (2007), Hinds and Kiesler (2002), 
Cyert and March (1963), Arrow (1962), Stiglitz (2000), and Joslyn and Rocha 
(2000).
As Sutton (1986) points out, a common definition of C2 will most likely 
never congeal. Just because something does not carry a universally recognized 
moniker does not mean it cannot be thought about or measured, or made better. 
Between C2 theory and C2 operations stands C2 Systems. I refined a model to 
shows process sequence as well as the information flow internally processed by 
the operator. By describing how information is integrated and reduced in stages, 
the model provides initial elucidation. I used the same model to represent 
asymptotic performance or something less than standard without defining 
individual failure. The model also conveyed various flows created from 
constrained extraction of the theater air power open system. In the propose 
process, inputs are matched with the operator's tacit knowledge or mental model
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and transformed to another type of output. Information at this stage underwent a 
higher level o f abstraction. If the blob of incoming information was unmatched, or 
is validated as irrelevant, it just ‘falls on the floor’ (blocked). Using this 
conceptual model, I took the available measures o f C2 and used a physical model 
(ELICIT) to examine the current theory of C2 (Network Center Warfare). I found 
it was salable and will have challenges in execution.
At the current time, all sorts of organizations, from nuclear control centers, 
to AOCs, to emergency management centers, to NASA, seem to have stumbled 
into the need to understand core C2 principles o f the information age. Over time, 
it will be easy to judge the winners and loser in this new realm of human activity. 
The loser will most likely continue to try to string systems together and complain 
about the results until they are swept away by the tides o f time and winner will 
“outthink” their problems. We have started in Maykish Stage 6 and the unique 
contribution of this paper is to begin to sort through the Uncertain that currently 
exists by pushing against the walls of darkness in which mankind eternally 
struggles.
World View (Recognized Limitation of the Student/Author)
I believe my selected research method supporting this dissertation work has led to 
an epistemic understanding of thought and arguments in Command and Control. To 
understand where “the question to explore resides,” one must define a personal 
perception of the universe. My personal perception is a recognized limitation. If I had to 
explain my life in one word, it would be “dichotomy.” I do not always believe my own 
senses, but, without a cogitative alternative, I must rely on them. The social universe
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impacts anyone’s world view in infinite ways. During the Middle Ages, “wise men” 
would bum witches at the stake for the sake o f their souls; there are many ways to be 
burnt alive today, both figuratively and literally, crossing social norms. Understanding 
how your work affects the lives of others is essential. I am a minimalist in both writing 
and thinking (Occam’s Razor). I like solutions that meet the criteria for success without a 
lot of overhead. I have never learned to type long passages of fluff. Academic work must 
pertain to the “real world” or it is simply grist for ink makers, paper mills, and librarians. 
There is nothing “wrong” with supporting the economy, but there are less narcissistic 
ways o f accomplishing it. Pure academic research is important; one of the greatest 
concepts so far created by man is that of “Zero.” It is likely that there are other concepts 
as great, still waiting to be uncovered (although, I do not think I will find any of them). 
Pure research strips mythology and superstition by establishing truths that withstand the 
test of time. It has been said: “men will work very hard not to think.” My goal in 
Engineering Management is to think and to encourage others to think.
What are my modes of reasoning? Am I inductive or deductive? Do I favor 
qualitative or quantitative approaches? I am surer o f what I do not want to do than what I 
want to do. I want to start a process and vector toward a goal best defined as somewhere 
other than the starting point. Inductive and deductive reasoning stem from the construct 
of a logical universe. I believe people often suffer “failure” when they default to the 
belief that the world is logical; many frustrated benevolent dictators believed the world 
would be “perfect” if everyone would implement their “logical” argument. Maybe the 
best reasoning models are political, or chaotic, or even an iambic pentameter model. I 
like the abduction model with inductive sequels and deductive branches for my trip into
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the unknown, even though an abduction model is less amenable to research (Sousa-Poza, 
n.d.), and this dissertation steers away from it.
I do not acquiesce to strict scientific process from theory, to hypothesis, to testing, 
and back to theory in a straight line vector. I take small steps, and, after a few, look 
around to see if the milieu is lighter or darker, then continue taking steps that increase 
illumination of “truth.” Therefore, as the eternal skeptic and always fallible, I will follow 
a construct o f Sun Tzu: “Know yourself and know your enemy, and in a thousand battles 
you will be safe.” That is a good place to start this journey.
What I do surmise is whatever country, organization, or non-state actor that 
improves operational execution through an understanding of C2 will gain a strategic 
advantage. Information age warfare will be different from industrial age warfare. The 
difference may be as great or greater that the difference between agrarian age warfare and 
industrial age warfare. I have hope that more data/information can be used as a resource, 
and will not just become a mote in our eye. Air power and ground power have combined 
to win the last five wars. Command and control is the glue that holds it all together.
I know researching C2 has provided me some understanding o f various subsets of 
issues. My hope is just to light one candle in a world that is still covered in much 
darkness. Then again, maybe my failure will put one more “There Monsters Be Here” on 
the map of C2.
I do appreciate this opportunity to “swim” in trying to understand C2. It has been 
a joy of discovery. I have learned how to think, and with the guidance of the many ODU 
professors, I have had some success. I thank you.
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Dr. Richard E. Hayes, founder and President o f Evidence Based Research, Inc. 
(EBR), is trained as a political scientist, social psychologist, and a methodologist. He has 
a rich background in international relations, comparative politics, decision making under 
stress, economics, and defense analysis. He specializes in multidisciplinary analysis of 
intelligence and national security issues; the identification o f opportunities to improve 
support to decision makers in the defense and intelligence communities; the design and 
development of systems to provide that support; and the criticism, test, and evaluation of 
systems and procedures that provide such support. His areas o f expertise include: 
political instability and social violence; political and economic development; 
development and validation of indicator and forecasting systems; crisis management; 
political-military issues; research methods; simulation and modeling; test and evaluation; 
military command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I); and decision aiding 
systems. He holds a Bachelor's degree from the Georgetown University School of 
Foreign Service and a Ph.D. from Indiana University.
B.l Notes from a Conversation with a Seminal C2 Author
On Day 2 of the CCRP 13th annual conference, I had an opportunity to have a 
long one-on-one conversation with Dr. Hayes. His words intrigued me: “The future of 
C2 is networking.” Dr. Hayes expressed that C2 is never a goal in itself, but there are 
three components: enablers, process, and people. People that have a deep understanding 
of C2 see the human network as proactive followership: change the infrastructure and it 
changes the social network where edge-functions are critical. C2 will become more and 
more networked as the field becomes user quality controlled with less time dependence
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on a single user holding knowledge, as you have both symmetric and asymmetric 
communication accruing, and more and more open source specialties where knowledge is 
a shared common resource. Concepts like networked targeting will be the norm, because 
“small world” structures are easily accepted. Enablers like Wikis will enable small 
groups of trusted people to become corporative gatekeepers o f knowledge. JEFX and the 
Air Force in general have not been the “poster child” for the C2 way ahead. C2 entropy 
in process is the adaption of people. What needs to be captured are the social networking 
functions. NATO has done some great work in the metrics’ need for assessment. 





<begin agent configuration parameters>
SenseMakingAgentEBR.jar 
com.ebrinc.elicit.agent.impl.SenseMakingAgent 
readyIntervalDelay|Time interval to click Ready button| 10000 
screeningSelectedMessageDelay|Screening selected message (message processing) 
delay|l 000
selectMessageFromQueueDelay|Select message from queue delay|1000 
informationProcessingDelay|Information Processing delay|3000 
pullBetweenSitesDelay|Pull between sites delay|1000 
postBetweenSitesDelay|Post between sites delay|500 
socialProcessingDelay|Social Processing delay|4000 
sharingPostingMessageDelay|Sharing/Posting each Message delay|5000 
awarenessProcessingDelay|Awareness Processing delay|3000 
determiningKnowledgeNeedsDelay|Determining Knowledge Needs delay|3000 
idAttemptDelay|ID Attempt delay|20000 
webRequestDelay|Web Request (Pull)|9000
primary|Primary areas of interest. Possible values: who, what, where, 
when)|who,what,where,when







minSolutionAreas|The minimum number of ID tables with some data| 1 
partialldentifyjldentify if there are no some answers|true
timeBeforeFirstIdentify|Time before the agent does its first identify (in minutes)|l 
shareBeforeProcessing|If true then share message before Processing|true 
propensityToSeek|PropensityToSeek possible values (low, moderate, high, very 
high)|moderate
postedTypes|PostedTypes|who,what,where,when 




postToFactoidAreaSitesOnly|True if factoid must be posted only to the appropriate 
sites|false
minTimeBetweenPullsForPropensityToSeekLow|It is used to set minTimeBetweenPulls, 
if propensityToSeek is low. If the time since the last pull is not >= 
minTimeBetweenPulls, do not Pull (in milliseconds)|300000 
minTimeBetweenPullsForPropensityToSeekModerate|It is used to set 
minTimeBetweenPulls, if propensityToSeek is moderate. If the time since the last pull is 
not >= minTimeBetweenPulls, do not Pull (in milliseconds)! 180000
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minTimeBetweenPullsForPropensityToSeekHigh|It is used to set minTimeBetweenPulls, 
if propensityToSeek is high. If the time since the last pull is not >= 
minTimeBetweenPulls, do not Pull (in milliseconds)|60000 
minTimeBetweenPullsForPropensityToSeekVeryHigh|It is used to set 
minTimeBetweenPulls, if propensityToSeek is very high. If the time since the last pull is 
not >= minTimeBetweenPulls, do not Pull (in milliseconds)|60000 
minTimeBetweenShares|If the time since the last Share is not >= 
minTimeBetweenShares, the agent should wait before it Shares (in milliseconds, -1 




provideRelevance|Provide relevance for posted and shared messages|false 
provideTrust|Provide trust for posted and shared messages|false 
reciprocity|Reciprocity possible values (high, low, medium, na, none)| 
trustInIndividuals|List of initial values of Trustlnlndividual for players in agent's team. 
Possible values (high, medium, distrust, no opinion)|
trustInWebSites|List of initial values of Trust for web sites. Possible values (high, 
medium, distrust, no opinion)|
trustInSources|List o f initial values of Trust for sorces. Possible values (high, medium, 
distrust, no opinion)|
messageQueueCapacity|Capacity o f queue (-1 means unlimited))-1
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messageQueueTimeRemainInQueue|Time a factoid can remain in queue (-1 means 
unlimited)|-l
messageQueueNewerBefore01der|If true then newer messages are selected before 
older| false
futilityThreshold|Time working in an area during which no new messages in that area are
processed before moving on to another area|-l
sharingModality | |both
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